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INTRODUCTION 
The Senate’s role in judicial appointments has come under 
increasingly withering criticism for its uninformative and 
“spectacle”-like nature.1 At the same time, Britain has established 
two new judicial appointment processes—to accompany its new 
Supreme Court and existing lower courts—in which Parliament 
plays no role.2 This Article seeks to understand the reasons for the 
inclusion and exclusion of the legislature in the U.S. and U.K. 
judicial appointment processes adopted at the creation of their 
respective Supreme Courts.3. 
The Article proceeds by highlighting the ideas and concerns 
motivating inclusion of the legislature in judicial appointments in 
the early American state constitutions, Articles of Confederation, 
and U.S. Constitution, noting how the Senate’s role has evolved 
since the time of the Constitution’s ratification. Part II charts the 
principal ideas and concerns motivating the Constitutional Reform 
Act’s recent overhaul of Britain’s judicial appointment system and 
rejection of a parliamentary role.  
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 1. See, e.g., Editorial, The Sotomayor Nomination, N. Y. TIMES, July 21, 
2009, at A20, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/21/opinion/ 
21tue1.html?scp=3&sq=editorial%20July%202009%20Sotomayor&st=cse 
(criticizing uninformative nature of Sotomayor confirmation hearing); see also 
DAVID M. O’BRIEN, JUDICIAL ROULETTE: A TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK 
FORCE REPORT ON JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS (1988) (critiquing Senate 
confirmation process and proposing reforms); BENJAMIN WITTES, 
CONFIRMATION WARS (2006) (proposing reforms to Senate confirmation 
hearing to reduce its spectacle quality, including prohibition on nominee 
testimony). 
2 Constitutional Reform Act 2005, Part 3, “Supreme Court.” 
 3. Albeit created 220 years apart.  The U.S. Supreme Court was 
established by the U.S. Constitution in 1787 and began operating in 1789. U.S. 
Const. Art. III; Judiciary Act of 1789. The U.K. Supreme Court was established 
by the Constitutional Reform Act of 2005 and began operating in 2009. Const. 
Reform Act 2005. 
 5. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Some Reflections on Method in Comparative 
Constitutional Law, in THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS, supra note 
161, at 67. 
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Thereafter, Part III compares and contrasts the reasons for 
inclusion and exclusion of the legislature in U.S. and U.K. judicial 
appointments. More specifically, Part III draws on Mark Tushnet’s 
comparative constitutional law methodology5 to explore the 
functional, contextual, and expressive significances of the different 
choices made vis-a-vis legislative involvement in U.S. and U.K. 
judicial appointments. 
The Article draws on functional analysis insofar as it charts the 
different functions served by the inclusion and exclusion of the 
legislature in U.S. and U.K. judicial appointments. According to 
Tushnet, “[F]unctionalists . . . look to how constitutional 
provisions actually operate in real-world circumstances, and . . . 
draw inferences about good constitutional design from the 
constitutional provisions that work best according to the 
functionalist’s normative standards.”6 Of note, Tushnet criticizes 
functionalism for its high degree of abstraction, i.e., for its failure 
to contextualize the analysis in the legal, political, and other 
cultural details of the particular systems at issue.7 Accordingly, 
Tushnet moves from functionalist to contextualist analysis to better 
understand the impact of different circumstances on the choices 
made.  
Like Tushnet, the Article engages in contextual analysis by 
seeking to understand the inclusion vs. exclusion of the legislature 
in judicial appointments in the U.S. and U.K.’s legal, political, and 
other cultural contexts.8 According to Tushnet, contextualism 
“emphasizes the fact that constitutional law is deeply embedded in 
the institutional, doctrinal, social, and cultural contexts of each 
nation.”9  
                                                                                                             
 6. Tushnet, supra note 193, at 73–74. 
 7. Id. at 74. See also James Q. Whitman, The Neo-Romantic Turn, in 
COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES: TRADITIONS AND TRANSITIONS 313 (Pierre 
LeGrand & Roderick Munday eds., 2003) (“Functionalism is an approach with 
many strengths, but it starts from at least one doubtful assumption: that all 
societies perceive life as presenting more or less the same social problems.”). 
 8. See generally VICKI JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN A 
TRANSNATIONAL ERA (2009); THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS, 
supra note 161; Tom Ginsburg, Lawrence Friedman’s Comparative Law, in 
LAW, SOCIETY AND HISTORY: ESSAYS ON THEMES IN THE LEGAL HISTORY AND 
LEGAL SOCIOLOGY OF LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN (Robert Gordon ed., forthcoming 
2010) (emphasizing importance of context to comparative analysis). 
  Naturally, any reference to culture should be made cautiously so as to 
avoid perpetuating “national or other stereotypes.” David Nelken, Defining and 
Using the Concept of Legal Culture, in COMPARATIVE LAW: A HANDBOOK 114 
(Esin Orucu & David Nelkan eds., 2007). 
 9. Tushnet, supra note 193, at 76.  Indeed, contextualism cautions that “we 
are likely to go wrong if we try to think about any specific doctrine or institution 
without appreciating the way it is tightly linked to all the contexts within which 
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 Lastly, the Article pursues expressive analysis by seeking to 
uncover the national identities and/or country self-understandings 
revealed by the different choices made with respect to the role of 
the legislature in judicial appointments.10 In pursuing each of these 
strands of comparative analysis, the Article is self-consciously 
hypothesis-generating rather than hypothesis-testing in nature.11
 In brief, the Article concludes that Tushnet’s methodology is 
helpful in underscoring, as a functional matter, the importance of 
the difference between presidential and parliamentary systems with 
respect to the role of the legislature as a check on the other 
branches.  The contextual analysis highlights the difference 
between legal and political constitutionalism characterizing the 
two systems, also helping to explain their divergent reliance on the 
legislature in judicial appointments.  Finally, Tushnet’s 
expressivist analysis reveals the U.S. and U.K.’s different 
resolutions of the tension between popular sovereignty and higher 
law principles in their judicial and judicial appointment processes. 
 
*** 
 
                                                                                                             
 
it exists.”  Id.  As Tom Ginsburg makes clear in reviewing Lawrence Friedman’s 
body of comparative law writing, “culture matters.” Tom  Ginsburg, “Lawrence 
M. Friedman’s Comparative Law,” in Law, Society, and History: Essays on 
Themes In the Legal History and Legal Sociology of Lawrence M. Friedman at 
9. (R. Gordon, ed. forthcoming 2010)  For an example of contextualist analysis, 
see, for example, Judith Resnik, Composing a Judiciary: Reflections on 
Proposed Reforms, in CONSTITUTIONAL INNOVATION: THE CREATION OF A 
SUPREME COURT FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM, Legal Studies: The Journal of the 
Society of Legal Scholars 228, 228 (Derek Morgan ed., 2004) (“I sit an ocean 
and a legal culture away. Asked to comment on reforms in England and Wales, 
my response is shaped by knowledge of the legal system of the U.S., which 
shares aspiration similar with and has been much influenced by the judicial 
system of England and Wales, but is also very different from it.”). 
 10. Tushnet, supra note 193, at 79–80. See generally ANTHONY BRUNDAGE 
& RICHARD COSGROVE, THE GREAT TRADITION: CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 
AND NATIONAL IDENTITY IN BRITAIN AND THE U.S., 1870–1960 (2007). Tushnet 
makes clear, however, that “it is a mistake to think that a nation has a single self-
understanding.” Tushnet, supra note 193, at 82. 
 11. See generally John Gerring, The Case Study: What It Is and What It 
Does, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS 98–99 (Carles 
Boix & Susan C. Stokes eds., 2007) (“[T]he world of social science may be 
usefully divided according to the predominant goal undertaken in a given study, 
either hypothesis generating or hypothesis testing. There are two moments of 
empirical research, a lightbulb moment and a skeptical moment, each of which 
is essential to the progress of a discipline.”).  
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With these functional, contextual, and expressive analyses in 
mind, the Article turns first to the ideas and concerns shaping the 
inclusion of the legislature in judicial appointments in the early 
American republic. 
I. IDEAS AND CONCERNS SHAPING CHOICE OF LEGISLATIVE 
INVOLVEMENT IN JUDICIAL APPOINTMENT PROCESSES IN THE 
EARLY AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS, ARTICLES OF 
CONFEDERATION, AND U.S. CONSTITUTION 
A. Introduction to Judicial Appointment Provisions in the State 
Constitutions, Articles of Confederation, and U.S. Constitution 
The early American state constitutions12 and Articles of 
Confederation13 relied heavily on the legislature for judicial 
appointments. Indeed, nine of thirteen states looked exclusively to 
the legislature for the appointment of judges, as did the Articles of 
Confederation government. This substantial reliance on the 
legislature for judicial appointments was consistent with legislative 
and popular sovereignty in the early American republic, reflecting 
a rejection of the despotic British crown and skepticism about 
concentrations of executive power under British rule more 
generally. It also reflected early Americans’ repudiation of the 
colonial judiciary, which had served without life tenure at the 
pleasure of the crown.14 Indeed, judges’ lack of independence 
formed one of the charges against the crown contained in the 
Declaration of Independence, i.e., that King George had “made 
Judges dependent on his will alone.”15 
Although nine states relied exclusively on legislative 
appointment of judges, three of the four remaining states provided 
for gubernatorial appointment with legislative advice and consent. 
This was true, for example, of Massachusetts’ constitution, which 
directed the governor to appoint judges with the advice and 
consent of counselors elected by the legislature.16 New 
                                                                                                             
 12. These state constitutions were enacted between 1776 and 1787. 
 13. The Articles of Confederation were enacted in 1777 and ratified in 
1781. 
 14. See, e.g., BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 105–06 (1992). 
 15. DAVID M. O’BRIEN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND POLITICS: STRUGGLES 
FOR POWER AND GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTABILITY 26 (3d ed. 1997) (citing 
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776)). 
 16. Notes on State Constitutions, in THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, 
PART TWO, at 1087, 1091 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1996) (reproducing MASS. 
CONST. OF 1780). 
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Hampshire’s appointment provision was closely modeled after that 
of Massachusetts,17 and Maryland likewise provided for 
gubernatorial appointment with the advice and consent of a 
legislative council.18 Lastly, New York provided for judicial 
appointments made by a council composed of the governor and 
senators serving together.19 At the time of the drafting of the U.S. 
Constitution, Alexander Hamilton, among others, criticized the 
New York model for its lack of transparency, asserting that it was 
impossible to know when a candidate was rejected whether that 
was due principally to the involvement of the governor or the 
legislators.20 
Governing at the national level in the period before the U.S. 
Constitution, the Articles of Confederation invested sole authority 
to establish courts and appoint judges in the Confederation 
Congress.21 As such, they mirrored the judicial appointment 
provisions of most state constitutions and were motivated by 
similar ideas of legislative and popular sovereignty and a perceived 
need to protect against a despotic executive. 
The U.S. Constitution’s provision for executive nomination 
and legislative confirmation of judges was a pronounced departure 
from the nearly exclusive legislative control over judicial 
appointments in the early American republic and was a response to 
the perceived excesses of legislative and popular sovereignty under 
the early state constitutions and Articles of Confederation.22 At 
least as importantly, the shift to dual-branch appointment of judges 
was a response to the Constitutional Convention’s “Great 
Compromise,” or “Connecticut Compromise,” in which the states 
gained equal representation in the Senate. 23 Following entry into 
the Compromise, delegates from the more populous states acted to 
constrain what they anticipated as the less populous states’ undue 
influence in the Senate, voting in favor of dual-branch appointment 
as a type of check on the small states.24 
                                                                                                             
 17. N.H. CONST. of 1776, available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/nh09.asp. 
 18. MD. CONST. OF 1776, available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/ma02.asp. 
 19. N.Y. CONST. of 1777, available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/ny01.asp. 
 20. THE FEDERALIST NO.77 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 21. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX. 
 22. Article II, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution provides that the President 
“shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall 
appoint . . . Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United 
States.”  
23 See infra Part I.B. 
24 See infra Part I.B. 
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The particulars of the Constitution’s dual-branch appointment 
provision were substantially modeled after those of the 
Massachusetts Constitution.25 Article IX of the Massachusetts 
Constitution provided: “All judicial officers . . . shall be nominated 
and appointed by the governor, by and with the advice and consent 
of the council [consisting of nine Senators chosen by the 
legislature] . . . .”26 
The Massachusetts model was not the first to be considered at 
the Constitutional Convention, however. Rather, as has been 
detailed elsewhere,27 the first judicial appointment model 
considered in Philadelphia was that of Virginia, with a proposal 
that the “National Legislature” appoint the judges.28 The 
Convention initially voted (nine to two) to locate the judicial 
appointment power exclusively in the Senate, and Senate 
appointment of judges remained the dominant model until close to 
the end of the Convention29 when agreement was reached on equal 
representation of the states. Other judicial appointment models 
considered at the Convention included appointment by the 
President standing alone30 and by the President with a one-third 
concurrence of the Senate.31 As such, Constitutional Convention 
                                                                                                             
25 Madison’s notes on July 18, 1787, in RFC, Vol. II at 41-42 (“[Mr. Ghorum] 
suggested that the Judges be appointed by the Executive, with the advice & 
consent of the 2d branch, in the mode prescribed by the constitution of Mass.”). 
 26. See Notes on State Constitutions, supra note 7. 
 27. See, e.g., SARAH BINDER & FORREST MALTZMAN, ADVICE & DISSENT 
(2009); RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, VOLS. I–III (Max Farrand ed., 
1967) [hereinafter 1 RFC, 2 RFC, 3 RFC]; GORDON S. WOOD, CREATION OF THE 
AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787 (1969); Henry Monaghan, The Confirmation 
Process: Law or Politics?, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1202 (1988); David Strauss & 
Cass Sunstein, The Senate, the Constitution, and the Confirmation Process, 101 
YALE L.J. 1491 (1992). 
 28. This was the so-called “Virginia Plan,” introduced by Edmund 
Randolph and drafted by James Madison. 1 RFC, supra note 17 (Madison’s 
notes of June 13, 1787 recording Mr. Randolph’s propositions, including, “11. 
Resold. that a Natl. Judiciary be established . . . to be appointed by the 2d. 
branch of the Natl. Legislature, to hold their offices during good behaviour 
. . . .”).  
 29. Appointment by the Senate remained the dominant model of judicial 
appointments until shortly before the Convention’s conclusion. Indeed, 
exclusive Senate appointment of judges was included in the draft constitution 
prepared by the Committee on Detail in August 1787. The final text of the 
Constitution was adopted on September 17, 1787. 
 30. This was proposed by Alexander Hamilton and favored by James 
Wilson. John Rutledge objected to this proposal as granting too “great a power 
to any single person.” According to Rutledge, “The people will think we are 
leaning too much towards Monarchy.” Madison’s notes of June 5, 1787, 
recording Mr. Rutledge’s objection, 1 RFC, supra note 17, at 119. 
 31. This was proposed by James Madison. 2 RFC, supra note 17, at 42–43. 
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delegates considered three broad models of judicial appointment: 
the legislature acting alone, the executive acting alone, and 
different combinations of the legislature and executive acting 
together. 
B. Why, in Greater Detail, was there a Shift from Legislative 
Appointment of Judges to Dual-branch Appointment in the early 
American republic? 
There is little recorded explanation for the shift from legislative 
to dual-branch appointment of judges at the Constitutional 
Convention. This is so in part because there are no detailed notes 
of the deliberations of the Committee of Eleven,32 the committee 
formed to resolve contested matters among the states.33 It was the 
Committee of Eleven that proposed dual-branch appointment to 
replace the earlier consensus for exclusive Senate appointment 
following entry into the compromise on equal representation of the 
states in the Senate.34 The importance of this compromise in 
shifting the choice of judicial appointment mechanism cannot be 
overstated.35 
As for the larger movement from reliance on legislative 
appointment of judges in the early American constitutions to dual-
branch appointment in the U.S. Constitution, nearly a dozen ideas 
and concerns animated this shift, including (1) a perceived need to 
constrain the excesses of popular and legislative sovereignty in the 
early American republic, (2) Madison’s belief in the wisdom of 
checks and balances overlaying a system of separated powers, and 
(3) a perceived need to temper Senate control with executive 
involvement once the compromise on equal Senate representation 
of the states had been reached. 
These and other reasons for the U.S. Constitution’s dual-branch 
appointment of judges are highlighted below. 
                                                                                                             
 32. SARAH BINDER & STEVEN SMITH, POLITICS OR PRINCIPLES? 
FILIBUSTERING IN THE U.S. SENATE (1996). Rather, there were reports of the 
conclusions reached by the Committee of Eleven. See, e.g., 2 RFC at 547 
(Madison’s notes of proceedings referencing the “last Report of Committee of 
Eleven”). 
 33. The Committee of Eleven was comprised of one delegate from each of 
the states represented at the Convention. 
34 The Committee of Eleven was constituted on July 2, 1787 to consider the 
question of equal representation of the states in the Senate. 1 RFC at 516 
(Madison’s notes of proceedings). Agreement was reached on the so-called 
“Great” or “Connecticut” Compromise on July 16, 1787. 2 RFC at 15 
(Madison’s notes). 
35 See infra Parts I.B.8&9. 
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1. Reaction to Perceived (and Actual) Excesses of Popular and 
Legislative Sovereignty in the Early American Republic 
The single most important reason for the shift from the then-
dominant legislative model of judicial appointment in state and 
Confederation constitutions to dual-branch appointment of judges 
in the U.S. Constitution was concern for the excesses of legislative 
and popular sovereignty in the early American republic and for 
insufficient executive oversight to protect individual liberties and 
minority interests.36 Although the Philadelphia Convention was 
originally called to amend the Articles of Confederation to provide 
greater executive oversight, most Constitutional Convention 
delegates came to believe that more than mere amendment of the 
Articles was necessary to create an effective national government 
that would promote the rule of law and preserve human liberty.37 
What was needed was a new Constitution that would rein in 
legislative and popular sovereignty to a much greater degree than 
had been true in the first dozen years of the new republic. 
Madison echoed this assessment in speaking to the Convention 
about the need to check legislative power:  
Experience in all the States had evinced a powerful 
tendency in the Legislature to absorb all power into its 
vortex. This was the real source of danger to the American 
Constitutions; & suggested the necessity of giving every 
defensive authority to the other departments that was 
consistent with republican principles.38 
Having served in the Virginia Assembly during the Articles of 
Confederation period, Madison had seen his and other proposals 
for reform “mangled by factional fighting and majoritarian 
confusion,”39 which made him hesitant about placing too much 
appointment power in the legislative branch. Indeed, Madison 
                                                                                                             
 36. This story is well-told in a number of sources.  See WOOD, supra note 
17; see also BAILYN, supra note 5; MARY SARAH BILDER, THE TRANSATLANTIC 
CONSTITUTION: COLONIAL LEGAL CULTURE AND THE EMPIRE (2004); DANIEL 
HULSEBOSCH, CONSTITUTING EMPIRE: NEW YORK AND THE TRANSFORMATION 
OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE ATLANTIC WORLD 1664–1830 (2005); GORDON 
S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY 22 (2009) [hereinafter WOOD, EMPIRE OF 
LIBERTY] (“By the 1780s many leaders had come to realize that the Revolution 
had unleashed social and political forces that they had not anticipated and that 
the ‘excesses of democracy’ threatened the very essence of their republican 
revolution.”). 
 37. James Madison, “Notes on Hamilton’s Speech to the Constitutional 
Convention on June 13, 1787,” 2 RFC, supra note 17, at 282–83. 
 38. Id. at 74 (Madison discussing the need to check legislative power). 
 39. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY, supra note 24, at 31–36. 
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observed in Federalist No. 10, “The instability, injustice and 
confusion introduced into the public councils, have, in truth, been 
the mortal diseases under which popular governments have 
everywhere perished . . . .”40 
In a related fashion, Hamilton rejected any suggestion that the 
House of Representatives appoint judges, concluding that “[t]he 
example of most of the States in their local constitutions 
encourages us to reprobate the idea.”41 The Constitutional 
Convention located the confirmation responsibility in the Senate, 
and not the House, because the Senate was intended as a more elite 
body,42 with election by the state legislatures (until the 1913 
amendment provided for direct election of Senators), a minimum 
age requirement of 30, and a longer term of service (six years 
versus two). The dual-branch appointment method, with reliance 
on the Senate and not the House, was a direct response then to the 
perceived excesses of legislative and popular sovereignty in the 
pre-Constitution period. 
2. Implementing Checks and Balances and Separation of 
Powers  Principles 
The choice of dual-branch appointment of judges was also 
importantly shaped by Madison’s checks and balances cautionary 
that “Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.”43 In a July 
17, 1787 speech at the Philadelphia Convention, Madison invoked 
checks and balances principles in emphasizing the importance of 
dual executive and legislative supervision of judicial appointments 
to preserve judges’ independence from incursion by either branch 
acting alone.44 Indeed, Madison spoke against a pure separation of 
powers on the ground that it provided insufficient security against 
corruption and intrigue. Madison instead urged reliance on the 
mutuality of checks and balances to ensure the proper functioning 
of government operations.45 
                                                                                                             
 40. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 129 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher 
Wright ed., 1961). 
 41. THE FEDERALIST NO. 77, at 488 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin 
Fletcher Wright ed., 1961). 
 42. See, e.g., WOOD, supra note 17, at 209 (“The Revolutionaries were 
generally confident that there existed in the community a ‘Senatorial part,’ a 
natural social and intellectual elite who, now that the Crown was gone, would 
find their rightful place in the upper houses of the legislatures.”). 
 43. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51(James Madison). 
 44. Madison’s notes on his own speech to the Convention on July 17, 1787, 
2 RFC, supra note 17, at 34–35. 
 45. Id. at 56 (comparing U.S. separation of powers with Britain’s balance of 
powers). 
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Madison addressed the desirability of checks and balances in a 
system of separated powers at greatest length in Federalist No. 51, 
stating: “[T]he great security against a gradual concentration of the 
several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those 
who administer each department the necessary constitutional 
means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the 
others.”46 Acknowledging that “[i]t may be a reflection on human 
nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses 
of government,” Madison nevertheless observed, “But what is 
government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human 
nature?”47  
More specifically, Constitutional Convention delegates 
believed that Senate confirmation of judges could serve as a check 
on executive corruption and intrigue (manifesting in the 
President’s personal preference or bias), just as executive 
nomination of judges could limit Senate corruption and intrigue 
(taking the form of vote-trading over individual appointments). In 
Federalist No. 77, Hamilton underscored the importance of the 
legislative check on executive discretion in judicial appointments: 
“In the only instances in which the abuse of the executive authority 
was materially to be feared [judicial appointments], the Chief 
Magistrate of the U.S. [the President] would . . . be subjected to the 
control of a branch of the legislative body. What more could be 
desired by an enlightened and reasonable people?”55 Hamilton 
contrasted the U.S. Constitution’s dual-branch appointment 
provision with that of his home state, New York, which lacked any 
meaningful opportunity for the public to discern which actors had 
                                                                                                             
46 Federalist No. 51. 
 47. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 356 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher 
Wright ed., 1961). 
 55. THE FEDERALIST NO. 77, at 489 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin 
Fletcher Wright ed., 1961). 
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done what with regard to individual judicial appointments.56  
Under the U.S. Constitution, “[T]he public would be at no loss to 
determine what part had been performed by the different actors.  
The blame of a bad nomination would fall upon the President 
singly and absolutely.  The censure of rejecting a good one would 
lie entirely at the door of the Senate, aggravated by the 
consideration of their having counteracted the good intentions of 
the Executive.”57 
3. Belief that Dual-branch Involvement Would Promote 
Greater Stability in Judicial Appointments and Foster Greater 
Judicial Independence 
Dual-branch participation and the mutuality of checks that 
resulted were also thought to provide greater stability to the 
judicial appointment process and greater independence to the 
overall judiciary. In Federalist No. 76, Hamilton observed that, in 
addition to serving as a check on executive favoritism and/or 
prejudice, participation by the Senate together with the Executive 
“would be an efficacious source of stability in the 
administration.”60 Changes in presidential administration would 
have less of a destabilizing effect on judicial appointments and the 
resulting judiciary if they were counter-balanced by the ongoing 
participation of the Senate.61 Involvement by the House of 
Representatives would not serve this purpose because its 
membership would constantly change.62 That the Senate was the 
                                                                                                             
 56. Id. at 486.  
57 Id. 
 60. THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, at 483 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin 
Fletcher Wright ed., 1961). 
 61. THE FEDERALIST NO. 77, at 485 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin 
Fletcher Wright ed., 1961) (“A change of the Chief Magistrate . . . would not 
occasion so violent or so general a revolution in the officers of the government 
as might be expected, if he were the sole disposer of offices.”). 
 62. THE FEDERALIST NO. 77, at 488 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin 
Fletcher Wright ed., 1961) (“A body so fluctuating and at the same time so 
numerous, can never be deemed proper for the exercise of that power. Its 
unfitness will appear manifest to all, when it is recollected that in half a century 
it may consist of three or four hundred persons. All the advantages of the 
stability, both of the Executive and of the Senate, would be defeated by this 
union, and infinite delays and embarrassments would be occasioned. The 
example of most of the States in their local constitutions encourages us to 
reprobate the idea.”). 
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more elite of the two legislative chambers also furthered the 
interests of stability in judicial appointments.63 Finally, the 
mutuality of checks was thought to foster greater judicial 
independence than if judges were dependent for appointment on 
either branch standing alone. 
4. Belief that Greater Transparency and Legitimacy of the 
Judicial Appointment Process Would Result from Dual-branch 
Involvement 
The preceding arguments led naturally to another, and that was 
for the improved transparency and legitimacy of the judicial 
appointment system made possible by participation of both the 
legislative and executive branches. Hamilton argued that greater 
transparency and legitimacy would result because the two-step 
process would enable the public to discern whether fault with a 
particular appointment lay with the President for nominating an 
insufficiently qualified candidate or with the Senate for rejecting a 
well-qualified candidate.64 
5. Belief that Greatest Accountability for Judicial 
Appointments would be Achieved by Dual-branch Participation 
Closely related to the previous point and to checks and 
balances principles more generally, many Convention delegates 
believed that greatest accountability for judicial appointments 
could be achieved by involvement of both the legislative and 
executive branches. Placing responsibility for initiating judicial 
appointments in the hands of a single actor, the President, rather 
than with the relatively numerous body of the Senate, would 
promote greater accountability for the quality of judicial 
appointments. Delegate Gorham of Massachusetts, for example, 
argued that the executive would be more answerable for the quality 
of judicial appointments than would individual Senators or the 
overall Senate.65 Likewise, Pennsylvania delegate James Wilson 
“opposed the appointmt [of Judges by the] national Legisl: 
Experience shewed the impropriety of such appointmts. by 
                                                                                                             
 63. WOOD, supra note 17, at 209. 
 64. THE FEDERALIST NO. 77 (Alexander Hamilton); see also MICHAEL 
COMISKEY, SEEKING JUSTICES: THE JUDGING OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES 31 
(2004) (“American Supreme Court justices have a particularly acute need for 
legitimacy. They must and do issue high-profile decisions that thwart the will of 
the democratic majority. . . . They depend on the voluntary compliance of the 
majority with their antimajoritarian decisions.”). 
 65. 2 RFC, supra note 17, at 41–42 (Madison’s notes on July 18, 1787). 
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numerous bodies. Intrigue, partiality, and concealment were the 
necessary consequences.”66 Thus, “[a] principal reason for unity in 
the Executive was that officers might be appointed by a single, 
responsible person.”67 
In Federalist No. 76, Hamilton argued that the President would 
do a better job of selecting high quality judicial candidates 
standing alone68 than would the Senate standing alone69 because 
the latter would be more susceptible to horse-trading or 
bargaining70 while the President’s sole responsibility for 
nomination would “beget a livelier sense of duty and a more exact 
regard to reputation.”71  
Hamilton nevertheless embraced what he perceived as the even 
better system of dual-branch appointment, reasoning that the 
President’s sense of responsibility vis-á-vis judicial appointments 
would be enhanced by Senate involvement:  
It will readily be comprehended, that a man who had 
himself the sole disposition of offices, would be governed 
much more by his private inclinations and interests, than 
when he was bound to submit the propriety of his choice to 
                                                                                                             
66 1 RFC at 119.  
 67. 1 RFC, supra note 17,  at 119 (Madison’s notes on June 5, 1787); see 
also, e.g., Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 17, at 1496 (discussing the decision to 
vest appointment power in the President). 
 68. THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, at 481 (Alexander Hamilton) (Howard 
Mumford Jones ed., 1961). Hamilton presupposed that the President would be “a 
man of abilities, at least respectable.” Id. On this basis, Hamilton “proceed[ed] 
to lay it down as a rule, that one man of discernment is better fitted to analyze 
and estimate the peculiar qualities adapted to particular offices, than a body of 
men of equal or perhaps even of superior discernment.” Id. Hamilton continued: 
The sole and undivided responsibility of one man will naturally beget a 
livelier sense of duty and a more exact regard to reputation. He will, on 
this account, feel himself under stronger obligations, and more 
interested to investigate with care the qualities requisite to the stations 
to be filled, and to prefer with impartiality the persons who may have 
the fairest pretentions to them. He will have fewer personal attachments 
to gratify, than a body of men who may each be supposed to have an 
equal number . . . .  
Id. 
 69. Hamilton was concerned that, if sole authority for judicial appointments 
was instead located in the Senate, an assembly of men would be subject to “a 
full display of all the private and party likings and dislikes, partialities and 
antipathies, attachments and animosities, which are felt by those who compose 
the assembly.” Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
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the discussion and determination of a different and 
independent body . . . .72 
Madison likewise believed that dual-branch appointment was 
important for accountability reasons because the President might 
not always be an enlightened actor, and Senate involvement as a 
check on the executive would therefore be critical.73 As Madison 
framed the issue when he proposed presidential appointment with a 
one-third concurrence by the Senate: “This would unite the 
advantage of responsibility in the Executive with the security 
afforded in the 2d branch agst. any incautious or corrupt 
nomination by the Executive.”74 
6. Belief that Dual-branch Involvement would Produce Higher 
Quality Judicial Appointments 
Convention delegates believed that evaluation of judicial 
candidates by both the legislative and executive branches would 
lead to higher quality appointments than if done by either branch 
acting alone.75 Indeed, the Constitutional Convention debate 
focused very little on what the judicial qualifications should be and 
much more on which entity was better able to evaluate judges.  
The possibility that the Senate might reject the President’s 
choice of judicial candidate was thought likely to make the 
President choose more carefully than in the absence of such a 
check. As Madison put it, involvement by the Senate provided a 
check against “any flagrant partiality or error.”76 Hamilton’s 
Federalist No. 76 echoed Madison in asserting that a Senate check 
on the President “would tend greatly to prevent the appointment of 
unfit characters from State prejudice, from family connection, from 
personal attachment, or from a view to popularity.”77 
7. Belief that Dual-branch Involvement would Produce More 
Diverse Judicial Appointments  
                                                                                                             
 72. Id. at 483. 
 73. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). 
 74. 2 RFC, supra note 17, at 42–43 (Madison’s notes on July 18, 1787). 
 75. THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, at 480 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin 
Fletcher Wright ed., 1961) (“It is not easy to conceive a plan better calculated 
than this to promote a judicious choice of men for filling the offices of the 
Union...”). 
 76. 2 RFC, supra note 17, at 80–83 (Madison reporting on his motion for 
executive appointment of July 21, 1787). 
 77. THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, at 483 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin 
Fletcher Wright ed., 1961). 
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Because of Senators’ geographic diversity, Constitutional 
Convention delegates believed that Senators would be able to draw 
on knowledge of a wider pool of judicial candidates than could the 
President standing alone, whose knowledge of prospective judicial 
candidates would likely be more limited to the national capital 
area.78 
The Senate’s ability to promote geographic diversity in judicial 
appointments was asserted by Roger Sherman, among others.79 
Gouverneur Morris countered that the executive would of necessity 
be involved in matters involving every part of the nation and thus 
would have greater knowledge of geographically diverse 
candidates.80 Delegate Gerry challenged Morris’ position, 
however, in declaring, “[h]e could not conceive that the Executive 
could be as well informed of characters throughout the Union, as 
the Senate.”81 In the end, the choice of dual-branch appointment 
tapped both the President’s and Senators’ knowledge of 
geographically diverse candidates. 
 
*** 
 
As important as any of the above factors to the choice of dual-
branch appointment were two pragmatic factors prompted by entry 
into the compromise on equal Senate representation of the states: 
8. Belief that Senate Involvement Would Enable Better 
Representation of State Interests, Especially Small State 
Interests, than Presidential Appointment Standing Alone 
Following entry into the Constitutional Convention’s 
compromise on equal Senate representation of the states, small 
state delegates thought it essential to maintain a Senate role in 
judicial appointments to preserve and promote their interests.82 At 
                                                                                                             
 78. 2 RFC, supra note 17, at 41–42 (Madison’s notes of July 18, 1787: “Mr. 
L. Martin was strenuous for an appt. by the 2d. branch. Being taken from all the 
States it wd. be best informed of characters & most capable of making a fit 
choice.”). 
 79. Id. at 41–42 (Mr. Sherman “add[ed] that the Judges ought to be 
diffused, which would be more likely to be attended to by the 2d. branch, than 
by the Executive.”). 
 80. Id. at 80–83 (Madison’s notes of July 21, 1787: Gouverneur Morris 
observed, “The Executive in the necessary intercourse with every part of the 
U.S. required by the nature of his administration, will or may have the best 
possible information.”). 
 81. Id. 
 82. See generally Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 17, at 1500 (“The split 
between the large and small states was among the most important political issues 
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the Connecticut ratification debates, for example, Oliver Ellsworth 
spoke of the Senate’s advice and consent role as important for 
ensuring participation by the smaller states in judicial 
appointments.83  
9. Belief that Presidential Involvement in Judicial 
Appointments Would Counter-balance the Senate’s Over-
representation of Small State Interests 
At the same time, delegates from the larger states believed that 
involvement of the executive in judicial appointments was 
essential to correct for the over-representation of small state 
interests in the Senate once the Great Compromise was reached. 
Madison made clear the impact of the compromise on the shift 
from Senate to dual-branch appointment of judges when he stated: 
[A]s the [Senate] was very differently constituted when the 
appointment of the judges was formerly referred to it, and 
was not to be composed of equal votes from all the States, 
the principle of compromise which had prevailed in other 
instances required in this that [there] shd. be a concurrence 
of two authorities, in one of which the people, in the other 
the states, should be represented.84  
Madison continued: “If the 2d branch alone [i.e., the Senate] 
should have this power, the Judges might be appointed by a 
minority of the people, tho’ by a majority, of the States, which 
could not be justified on any principle as their proceedings were to 
relate to the people, rather than to the States.”85  
 
Thus, the dual-branch appointment of judges was understood 
as a compromise enabling representation of state interests by the 
Senate and the broader public’s interest by the President.86 
                                                                                                             
 
of the period. Some delegates were fearful that all judicial nominees would 
come from large states.”). 
 83. Elliott’s Debates, “In the Name of the People of the State of 
Connecticut,” in “The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption 
of the Federal Constitution [Elliot’s Debates, Vol. 1], Ratification,” 
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwed.html; see also James E. Gauch, 
Comment, The Intended Role of the Senate in Supreme Court Appointments, 56 
U. CHI. L. REV. 337, 349–50 (1989). 
 84. 2 RFC, supra note 17, at 80–83. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 17, at 1500, which asserts that the 
Senate’s advice and consent role was intended to provide security in protecting 
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C. Substantial Evolution of the Senate’s Judicial Appointment role 
from the Time of the Constitutional Convention 
The Senate’s role in judicial appointments has evolved 
substantially from that provided at the time of the Constitution’s 
adoption. Among the most important changes are:  
(1) Senators’ use of judicial selection commissions to 
recommend district court and court of appeals candidates to the 
president. A practice that began during the Carter administration, 
Senators now oversee twelve judicial selection commissions 
operating in their home states to recommend local candidates for 
lower court judgeships.87 Presidents have varied in the deference 
accorded Senators’ lower court candidate recommendations, with 
more deference typically given to district than to appellate 
recommendations.  
(2) Individual Senator’s invocation of a “blue-slip privilege” 
to block consideration of a nominee from the Senator’s home state. 
The blue-slip practice has varied in recent years, but typically 
works as follows: the Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee 
(SJC) distributes blue slips to the home state Senators for the 
district court or court of appeals seat under consideration. If a 
home state Senator refuses to return the blue slip or returns it to the 
SJC Chair with an objection noted, then the President’s nominee is 
not brought before the SJC for consideration.89  
                                                                                                             
 
against the confirmation of nominees “insensitive to the interests of a majority 
of the states. In this sense, political commitments were understood to be a 
properly central ingredient in senatorial deliberations.” 
 87. U.S. Senators currently oversee seventeen or eighteen judicial selection 
(or “advisory”) commissions in California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, 
Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Massachusetts (possibly), Michigan, Minnesota, North 
Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Vermont, Washington, and 
Wisconsin. The Governance Institute & Institute for the Advancement of the 
American Legal System, “Options for Federal Judicial Screening Committees,” 
Appendix (June 2010) (listing 18 states with judicial selection (or “advisory”) 
commissions overseen by their respective U.S. Senators, with possible caveat 
for Massachusetts), available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/rc/papers/2010/0702_federal_judicial_
wheeler/0702_federal_judicial_wheeler.pdf; see also Russell Wheeler,  Prevent 
Federal Court Nomination Battles: De-Escalating the Conflict over the 
Judiciary, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Aug. 11, 2008), 
http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2007/1120_judiciary_wheeler_opp08.aspx. 
 89. See, e.g., Brannon Denning, The “Blue-Slip”: Enforcing the Norms of 
the Judicial Confirmation Process, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 75 (2001). 
 92. The only way to overcome a filibuster and proceed to a vote on a given 
matter is for 60 Senators to vote for cloture, i.e., the end of debate. Filibuster 
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(3) Use of filibusters and individual member holds to delay or 
prevent Senate confirmation hearings or votes. A procedure by 
which a minority of senators can prevent the close of debate and 
thereby forestall a hearing or vote on a given matter,92 the filibuster 
did not develop until the mid-nineteenth century96 and was not 
                                                                                                             
 
and Cloture, SENATE.GOV, http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/ 
common/briefing/Filibuster_Cloture.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2010). 
 96. According to Binder, the first filibuster was in 1837. Sarah A. Binder, 
The History of the Filibuster, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Apr. 22, 2010), 
http://www.brookings.edu/testimony/2010/0422_filibuster_binder.aspx 
(recounting Sarah Binder’s testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on 
Rules and Administration on April 22, 2010). Catherine Fisk and Erwin 
Chemerinsky recount a different history of the filibuster. They date the first 
“dilatory debate,” defined as the “strategic use of delay in debate,” to 1790 with 
deliberations over the location of the nation’s Capitol. Fisk & Chemerinsky, 
supra note 74, at 187. The first filibuster of a judicial nominee was in 1881. 
Gerhardt, supra note 71, at 453. 
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introduced in its modern form until 1917. In recent years, 
filibusters and threats of filibuster have been used increasingly 
frequently against lower court nominations. 
At the same time, there has been a marked increase in the 
placement of individual Senator’s anonymous holds on 
nominations, which also delay confirmation hearings and/or 
votes.97  
(4) Payment of courtesy calls by Supreme Court nominees with 
individual Senators prior to their confirmation hearings and/or 
votes. This practice has provoked concern for whether Senators are 
pressing judicial candidates for commitments on particular issues 
or cases, given the lack of transparency and accountability 
associated with these private sessions.100 
(5) Senatorial investigation of judicial nominees independent 
from those conducted by the executive branch. Since the late 
1970s, the Senate Judiciary Committee has conducted 
investigations of all judicial candidates in addition to those 
performed by the Justice Department, White House, and Federal 
Bureau of Investigation.101  
(6) Senate Judiciary Committee “gate-keeping” as to whether 
a confirmation hearing or vote will be scheduled on a given 
judicial nominee, where the Committee’s failure to call for a 
hearing or vote effectively kills a nomination.103  
(7) Introduction of Senate confirmation hearings featuring 
testimony by nominees and other witnesses explicitly identified as 
supporting or opposing the nominee.105 Lengthy candidate 
                                                                                                             
 97. See, e.g., Gerhardt, supra note 71, at 450–51 (describing Senators’ holds 
on judicial appointments); see also EPSTEIN & SEGAL, supra note 71, at 98 
(“Holds occur when a senator asks his or her party leader to delay action on a 
nominee; it is then up to the party leader to grant the request and to determine 
the length of the delay.”). 
 100. WITTES, supra note 1. 
 101. EPSTEIN & SEGAL, supra note 68, at 89–90. 
103 Gerhardt, Federal Appointments Process. 
 105. Supreme Court confirmation hearings were not held until the early 
twentieth century and not held regularly or publicly until the middle of the 
twentieth century. See, e.g., HENRY ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS AND 
SENATORS (7th ed. 2004). 
 109. See, e.g., MICHAEL GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS: 
A CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS (2000). 
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testimony is now part of the regular fabric of Article III 
confirmation hearings,109 though some commentators have 
recommended abolishing it, given the “Kabuki theatre” that such 
hearings have become, with Senators’ grandstanding questions and 
candidates’ evasive responses.110  
(8) Submission of reports to the Senate Judiciary Committee by 
the American Bar Association Standing Committee on the Federal 
Judiciary, evaluating the professional qualifications of federal 
judicial nominees. Established early in the Eisenhower 
administration, the American Bar Association Standing Committee 
on the Federal Judiciary plays a central role in the investigation 
and evaluation of federal judicial candidates.111  
In addition to these changes in the Senate process, there are a 
number of ongoing concerns with the Senate’s confirmation role 
that are important in considering the merits of legislative 
involvement in judicial appointments. These include (1) whether 
there should be a “presumption in favor of a nominee’s 
confirmation,”113 particularly at the Supreme Court level, i.e., 
whether the Senate should defer to the President’s choice of 
nominee;114 (2) the proper extent of Senate inquiry into the 
nominee’s judicial philosophy or ideology;115 (3) the proper extent 
                                                                                                             
 110. See, e.g., O’BRIEN, supra note 1; WITTES, supra note 1, at 119. But see 
MALTESE, supra note 86. 
 111. See, e.g., SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER 
COURT SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN (1997); see also Mary 
L. Clark, Carter’s Groundbreaking Appointment of Women to the Federal 
Bench: His Other “Human Rights” Record, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & 
L. 1131 (2003). 
 113. COMISKEY, supra note 50, at 10, 192 (noting that “Senators owe the 
President no deference in appointing justices”). 
 114. See, e.g., GERHARDT, supra note 88; Charles L. Black, Jr., A Note on 
Senatorial Consideration of Supreme Court Nominees, 79 YALE L.J. 657, 663–
64 (1970) (“In a world that knows that a man’s social philosophy shapes his 
judicial behavior, that philosophy is a factor in his fitness. If it is a philosophy 
the Senator thinks will make a judge whose service on the Bench will hurt the 
country, then the Senator can do right only by treating this judgment of his, 
unencumbered by deference to the President’s, as a satisfactory basis in itself for 
a negative vote.” (emphasis added)). 
 115. See generally CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, THE NEXT JUSTICE: 
REPAIRING THE SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS PROCESS 148 (2007); see also 
COMISKEY, supra note 50, at 20 (“[T]here are clear indications that many of the 
Framers did countenance ideological scrutiny of nominees—or at the least 
would not have been surprised by it.”); Cass Sunstein, Senate Committee 
Hearings on the Judicial Nomination Process, 50 DRAKE L. REV. 429, 463 
(2002) (Professor Cass Sunstein stating, “My basic conclusion is simple. 
Ideology should certainly matter, both for the President and for the Senate.”). 
But see John O. McGinnis, The President, the Senate, the Constitution, and the 
Confirmation Process: A Reply to Professors Strauss and Sunstein, 71 TEX. L. 
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of the President’s pre-nomination consultation with Senators 
regarding desirable judicial candidates;116 and (4) whether 
politicization of the nomination and confirmation process is 
appropriate.  
Awareness of the extent to which today’s Senate confirmation 
role differs from that intended at the time of the Constitution’s 
adoption and of ongoing tension over the Senate’s optimal judicial 
appointment role, is important for understanding the relevance of 
the U.S. model to the continuing debate over the possibility, and 
desirability, of a parliamentary role in U.K. judicial appointments, 
to which the Article now turns. 
II. IDEAS AND CONCERNS SHAPING THE ONGOING ABSENCE OF 
PARLIAMENT FROM THE U.K. JUDICIAL APPOINTMENT PROCESS 
Neither historically nor currently has there been a formal role 
for Parliament in judicial appointments. This is so even despite the 
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. This Part seeks to 
understand why this is. It begins with a brief introduction to the 
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, followed by an overview of 
judicial appointment practices in Britain. It then highlights the 
Constitutional Reform Act’s (CRA) reforms of the U.K.’s judicial 
appointment system and the principal motives for it. This Part 
concludes by hypothesizing reasons for Parliament’s ongoing 
absence from the judicial appointment process.118 
                                                                                                             
 
REV. 633, 641 (1993) (arguing that choice of judicial nominee is properly 
exclusively that of the President). 
 116. See Sunstein, supra note 94 (noting that language of the “advice and 
consent” clause appears to assign an advisory role to the Senate pre-
nomination). But see McGinnis, supra note 94, at 638–46 (arguing that there is 
no basis in text or practice for asserting a consultative role for the Senate in 
judicial appointments; rather, “advice and consent” modifies “appoint” and not 
“nominate” from which it is separated by a comma). 
 118. This Article seeks to avoid conflating “legislative involvement in 
judicial appointments” with “legislative confirmation hearings on judicial 
nominees.” Rather, parliamentary involvement in judicial appointments could 
take a range of forms, including, inter alia, participation by Members of 
Parliament in judicial appointment commissions or parliamentary investigation 
and evaluation of judicial nominees without resort to public hearings and 
without resort to confirmation vote. Mary L. Clark, Introducing a Parliamentary 
Confirmation Process for Supreme Court Justices?, 2010 PUB. L. 464. 
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A. Introduction to the Doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty 
William and Mary officially recognized Parliament’s 
sovereignty, or “supremacy,” when they executed a Bill of Rights 
with Parliament in 1689 following the English Civil War, 
Restoration, and Glorious Revolution of 1688.119 Pursuant to the 
doctrine of parliamentary supremacy, the legislature was 
acknowledged as the final arbiter of the law, rather than the Crown 
or the judiciary.120  
Blackstone articulated the orthodox account of parliamentary 
supremacy when he declared in his Commentaries on the Laws of 
England: “‘[T]here is and must be in all [forms of government] a 
supreme, irresistible, absolute, uncontrolled authority, in which the 
jura summi imperii, or the rights of sovereignty, reside,’” and in 
England this “‘sovereignty of the British constitution’ was lodged 
in Parliament, the aggregate body of King, Lords, and Commons, 
whose actions ‘no power on earth can undo.’”121 
Blackstone’s account has, at times, been more rhetorical than 
real, where British courts have from time to time reviewed 
parliamentary acts for compliance with constitutional norms since 
at least Coke’s 1610 opinion in Bonham’s Case.122 While that case 
                                                                                                             
 119. STEVE PINCUS, 1688: THE FIRST MODERN REVOLUTION 15–17 (2009) 
Pincus notes that, while Robert Walpole (Prime Minister for two decades 
beginning in 1720) insisted that the Revolution and its aftermath had established 
parliamentary sovereignty, the Opposition Whig ideology insisted that the 
Revolution had established popular sovereignty. Id. Parliamentary sovereignty 
is the dominant concept used today. Joyce Malcolm notes that, rather than 
“swearing to keep the laws and customs granted by the king’s predecessors, 
William and Mary swore that they and their succesesors … would govern 
‘according to the statutes in Parliament agreed on, and the laws and customs of 
the same.’”  J.L. & Pol. (quoting Coronation Oath Act (1689), 5 W. & M. 3 & 
2). 
 120. See, e.g., ALBERT VENN DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE 
LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (1885). Rakove hypothesizes that the assertion of 
legislative supremacy might have been more about “prevent[ing] an arbitrary 
monarch from ruling in his own name and without parliamentary consent” than 
“enabling the good people of England to enact the laws they desired.” Jack 
Rakove, The Origins of Judicial Review: A Plea for New Contexts, 49 STAN. L. 
REV. 1031, 1052 (1997) (citing JACK RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS 
AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1996)). 
 121. William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765), as 
quoted in BAILYN, supra note 5, at 201–02. 
 122. Bonham’s Case (C.P. 1610), Coke, Reports (Act of Parliament will be 
void if against “common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be 
performed”). See Joyce Lee Malcolm, Whatever the Judges Say It Is? The 
Founders and Judicial Review, 26 J.L. & POL. (forthcoming 2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1597768. As Malcolm recounts, “Coke claimed that 
basic principles of justice were so sacred that if the legislators ‘were to 
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pre-dated the late seventeenth century recognition of parliamentary 
supremacy, recent work by Joyce Malcolm suggests that this 
practice of judges determining laws’ compliance with 
constitutional norms (though not called “judicial review”) did not 
measurably change following recognition of parliamentary 
supremacy.123 Though the dominant view remains that 
parliamentary supremacy was the principal understanding by 
which courts abided, care must be taken in referencing the doctrine 
to avoid overstating the power of the legislature vis-a-vis the 
                                                                                                             
 
transgress them it would be the right and duty of the judges to pay no attention 
to such enactments.’” Id. at 15 (quoting CHARLES GROVE HAINES, THE 
AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 28 (1914)). 
  Hamburger cautions that Bonham’s Case was not “an argument for 
holding statutes void, but rather for equitable interpretation.” Hamburger seeks 
to clarify that “judges used arguments about what was void in conscience or 
against natural equity to establish the moral foundation for their equitable 
interpretation of statutes, and this is what Coke did in Bonham’s Case.”  
Nonetheless, Hamburger acknowledges that Bonham’s Case “was susceptible of 
being misunderstood, and many Americans took pleasure in a misinterpretation 
that allowed them to believe that judges could actually hold an act of Parliament 
unlawful.”  Law and Judicial Duty at 274. 
 123. Malcolm, supra note 101, at 7 (“Blackstone insisted Parliament’s acts 
were beyond review by the courts.  This view was still controversial. A year 
after the appearance of Blackstone’s Commentaries[,] Lord Camden . . . insisted 
upon the traditional view that parliamentary legislation that was against law was 
unconstitutional and void.”); see also Malcolm at 16-17 (recounting 1701 
opinion in City of London in which the judges stated that an act of Parliament 
would be void if it instructed a judge to be a judge in his own cause in violation 
of impartiality principles); WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY, supra note 24, at 406 
(“Even with the development of parliamentary sovereignty in the eighteenth 
century, English judges continued to interpret and construe parliamentary 
statutes in such a way as to fit them into the entire legal structure. Thus 
eighteenth-century English common law judges, despite having to acknowledge 
the sovereign law-making authority of Parliament, were left with an 
extraordinary amount of room for statutory interpretation and construction.” 
(footnote omitted)); PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY 17 (2008). 
Hamburger observes, “[E]ven in England, they sometimes had to hold 
unconstitutional acts unlawful.” 
  Hamburger provides a detailed account of English judges’ responses to 
parliamentary supremacy in his recent Law and Judicial Duty.  According to 
Hamburger, though judges were reluctant to overturn parliamentary enactments 
in the face of the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy, there were other “lesser” 
laws that judges voided on grounds of noncompliance with the constitution.  
Hamburger also underscores the importance of recognizing judges as 
interpreting parliamentary acts, as in Bonham’s Case, rather than striking them 
down.  Id. at 274. 
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courts.  Still, parliamentary supremacy plays a critical conceptual 
role in understanding British law and politics.124 
B. Historic Judicial Appointment Practices in Britain 
Nearly exclusive authority to name judges to courts high and 
low rested until 2005 with the Lord Chancellor,125 a principal 
advisor to the Crown and, later, to the Prime Minister.126 Until the 
very recent introduction of judicial appointment commissions at 
the lower court level and even more recently at the Supreme Court 
level, the Lord Chancellor collected information on potential 
judicial candidates by conducting private consultations, or “secret 
soundings,” with unnamed judges and senior bar members.128 
Whom the candidate knew and where the candidate came from 
(including where the candidate went to school) mattered heavily in 
this process.129 The Lord Chancellor’s selection of judicial 
candidates were typically made by means of “taps on the shoulder” 
to serve.  
Thus, despite the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, 
Parliament had no formal role in the judicial appointment process. 
Individual Members of Parliament (MPs) did, however, succeed in 
influencing judicial appointments behind the scenes. According to 
                                                                                                             
 124. BRUCE F. NORTON, POLITICS IN BRITAIN (2007) (“[P]arliamentary 
sovereignty may be a political fiction, but it continues to dictate the formal 
structures of the British constitution. . . . Each constitutional reform . . . has been 
accompanied by a ritual reaffirmation of the continuing centrality of 
parliamentary sovereignty to the legitimation of the state and government.”). 
 125. The Lord Chancellor position dates to 605. Peter L. Fitzgerald, 
Constitutional Crisis over the Proposed Supreme Court for the United Kingdom, 
18 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 233, 235 (2004). 
 126. The office of the Prime Minister was created in the early eighteenth 
century following the Glorious Revolution and 1701 Act of Settlement. See 
Pincus, supra note 98; see also JOHN LANGBEIN ET AL., HISTORY OF THE 
COMMON LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 
(2009). 
 128. Judith L. Maute, English Reforms to Judicial Selection: Comparative 
Lessons for American States?, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 387, 397 (2007). 
 129. Id. at 396. 
 131. The Act of Settlement granted judges the rights of service in “good 
behavior,” replacing the prior convention of service at the pleasure of the 
Crown. The Act of Settlement 1701, 12 & 13 Will. 3, c.2, sec.3 (Engl.).  It was 
not until 1760, that high court judges gained tenure in good behavior for the 
duration of their lives.  Prior to that change, high court judges’ tenure could be 
terminated upon the succession of a new monarch and often was.  1799 saw the 
introduction, by Parliament, of judicial pensions, which, like life tenure in good 
behavior, promoted judicial independence. 
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Robert Stevens, “[w]hile the Act of Settlement131 may have been 
intended to prevent royal interference with the judges, Parliament 
showed no interest in curbing its tradition of interfering with the 
judges.”132  
This appointment process eventually came to be criticized for 
its lack of transparency and accountability, as the following 
discussion highlights. 
C. Pre-CRA Critiques of British Judicial Appointment Practices 
A number of commentators writing in the late 1990s and early 
2000s predicted that reform of the judicial appointment process 
was imminent, given the deficits in transparency and democratic 
accountability resulting from the Lord Chancellor’s “secret 
soundings” and “taps on the shoulder” to serve. These 
commentators included Sir Thomas Legg134 and Professors Robert 
Hazell,135 Andrew Le Sueur,136 Kate Malleson,137 Robert 
Stevens,138 and Diana Woodhouse.139 For these and other 
commentators, the question was not whether there should or would 
be reform but, as Malleson framed it, “whether reform can be 
carried out within the existing structure or whether more 
substantive change to the system is required.”140 
Legg, who as Permanent Secretary to the Lord Chancellor had 
been the primary individual charged with screening judicial 
candidates, wrote, “slightly . . . heretically,” that in light of judges’ 
                                                                                                             
 132. ROBERT STEVENS, THE ENGLISH JUDGES: THEIR ROLE IN THE CHANGING 
CONSTITUTION 10 (2002). 
   
 134. See, e.g., Thomas Legg, Brave New World—The New Supreme Court 
and Judicial Appointments, 24 LEGAL STUD. 45 (2004). 
 135. See, e.g., R. Hazell, ed., Constitutional Futures Revisited: Britain’s 
Constitution to 2020 (2008). 
 136. See, e.g., Andrew Le Sueur, Developing Mechanisms for Judicial 
Accountability in the UK, 24 LEGAL STUD. 73 (2004). 
 137. See, e.g., KATE MALLESON, THE NEW JUDICIARY: THE EFFECTS OF 
EXPANSION AND ACTIVISM (1999). 
 138. See, e.g., STEVENS, supra note 111; Robert B. Stevens, The 
Independence of the Judiciary: The View from the Lord Chancellor’s Office, 8 
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 222 (1988). 
 139. See, e.g., Diana Woodhouse, The Constitutional and Political 
Implications of a United Kingdom Supreme Court, 24 LEGAL STUD. 134, 151 
(2004). 
 140. Kate Malleson, Selecting Judges in the Era of Devolution and Human 
Rights, in BUILDING THE UK’S NEW SUPREME COURT 305 (Andrew Le Sueur 
ed., 2004). 
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recently expanded powers of review, “there is now a strong case 
for requiring the candidate selected by the Prime Minister to be 
confirmed by a joint committee of both Houses of Parliament 
before his or her name is submitted to the Queen.”141 Legg was 
quick to add that a parliamentary confirmation process “need not 
necessarily involve a public hearing, as happens in the Judiciary 
Committee of the U.S. Senate.”142 Legg reasoned,  
It is not just fitting, but, I believe, necessary that both the 
other two branches of government, that is the legislature as 
well as the executive, should concur in the appointment of 
the nation’s most senior judges. This is especially so since 
the legislature is the only branch of government with power 
to remove a senior judge.143 
Advocating a parliamentary role in greater detail, University of 
London Law Professor Kate Malleson highlighted the democratic 
accountability and public education benefits to be realized from 
legislative branch questioning of Supreme Court nominees.144 In 
addition to these benefits, Malleson suggested that legislative 
hearings on Supreme Court nominees might help check the 
growing power of the executive because the executive would less 
likely be able to use Supreme Court appointments as a tool of 
political patronage if Parliament scrutinized its candidate 
choices.145 Moreover, Malleson suggested that the role of 
partisanship or ideology in the Supreme Court appointment process 
could be ameliorated by a parliamentary confirmation process to 
the extent that “the involvement of a number of MPs from different 
parties ensures that no one ideological position will inevitably 
dominate.”146 Malleson concluded, “The justification for the 
participation in some form of the elected branches of government 
                                                                                                             
141 See supra note 128. 
142 See supra note 128. 
 143. Legg, supra note 113, at 46. Robert Stevens notes that Legg had 
supported House of Lords interviews of senior judge candidates pre-CRA 
because “judges have moved to take a more central stage in various political 
matters.” Stevens, supra note 106, at 28. 
 144. Kate Malleson, Parliamentary Scrutiny of Supreme Court Nominees: A 
View from the United Kingdom, 44 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 557, 561 (2006) (“If we 
accept that some form of public questioning of supreme court candidates or 
appointees by elected representatives is necessary to provide a link to the 
democratic process and greater public engagement with the judicial 
appointments process, then there are strong arguments for the legislature as the 
best forum for this process.”). 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. Malleson acknowledges that “[p]artisan political concerns will not, 
of course, be absent from a hearing before a legislative committee.” Id. 
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in the appointments process of the highest ranks of the judiciary is, 
therefore, clear.”147 
Writing shortly before the Blair administration unveiled its 
constitutional reform proposal in 2003, Cambridge Law Professor 
Robert Stevens asserted that if a new U.K. Supreme Court were to 
be created, strong consideration should be given to introducing a 
parliamentary confirmation process for new Supreme Court 
justices.148 Stevens advocated a parliamentary confirmation role, 
even while acknowledging intense British anxiety about any type 
of public confirmation process because of the perceived defects of 
the U.S. process.149 Specifically anticipating the Blair 
administration’s recommendation of a Supreme Court appointment 
commission, Stevens declared, “Judges choosing judges is the 
antithesis of democracy.”150 In its place, Stevens advocated public 
questioning of Supreme Court nominees by an elected body. “The 
choice of judges is too important to be left to a quango [a judicial 
appointments commission]. . . . [I]f there is to be a Constitutional 
or Supreme Court, its judges must be chosen by elected officials 
and subject to examination by a democratic body.”151 As Stevens 
correctly predicted, adherence to the “mythology” of parliamentary 
supremacy, taken together with an unwillingness to acknowledge 
the growing power of the courts, would be major impediments to 
appreciation of the need for legislative involvement in Supreme 
Court appointments.152 
                                                                                                             
 147. Kate Malleson, Introduction to APPOINTING JUDGES IN AN AGE OF 
JUDICIAL POWER 6 (Kate Malleson & Peter H. Russell eds., 2006). 
148 See supra note 140. 
 149. STEVENS, supra note 111, at 143–46 (“[The British public] share a 
Hamiltonian willingness to leave the final choice to a wise elder (The Lord 
Chancellor); and they remain nervous about any further openness in the process. 
Many appear to be especially uncomfortable with any system which would 
allow judges to be questioned either about their political or personal views or 
their suitability to be judges.”). Later, Stevens opined that “[t]he idea of a 
potential judge being subjected by politicians to [that] kind of grilling . . . is, 
however, anathema to bench and bar alike.” Id. at 176. Stevens continued, 
“Moves in that direction run into the distaste created by the televised hearings 
on Robert Bork and Clarence Thomas before the U.S. Senate.” Id. 
150 See supra note 140. 
151 See supra note 140. 
 152. Id. at 143–46 (“The English are somewhat reluctant to come to grips 
with the implications of a judiciary increasingly involved with what, in other 
societies, would be regarded as political issues. The cult of parliamentary 
sovereignty hangs so heavily in the air that the reality of recent transfers of 
powers to the judges and others is shrouded in its mythology.”). 
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D. The Government’s 2003 Judicial Reform Proposals and 
Parliamentary Debate on the Possibility of a Legislative Role in 
Judicial Appointments 
In June 2003, the Blair administration proposed abolishing the 
Appellate Committee of the Law Lords and establishing a new 
Supreme Court in its place.153 At the same time, the Administration 
proposed a new way of appointing judges, including abolition of 
the Lord Chancellor’s office, which was later revisited.154 The 
Government’s announcement was soon followed by the issuance of 
two consultation papers, “Constitutional Reform: A Supreme Court 
for the U.K.”155 and “Constitutional Reform: A New Way of 
Appointing Judges.”156 In neither consultation paper was there 
reference to the possibility of a formal judicial appointment role 
for Parliament. 
Both Houses of Parliament held hearings on the Government’s 
proposal.157 A number of witnesses testified before the House of 
Commons Constitutional Affairs Select Committee in favor of 
parliamentary scrutiny or confirmation of judicial candidates.158 
These witnesses included Professor Robert Hazell, who 
emphasized the increased accountability to be had through 
parliamentary scrutiny, testifying, “Appointments to the judiciary 
are too important to be left to the judiciary alone, or to a Judicial 
Appointments Commission. The judges would be perceived to be a 
self-appointing oligarchy, especially if the Commission was 
chaired by a senior judicial figure”159 (as it eventually was). As a 
                                                                                                             
153 See supra note 142. 
 154. For a detailed account of how the CRA was proposed, debated, and 
ultimately enacted, see Andrew Le Sueur, From Appellate Committee to 
Supreme Court: A Narrative, in THE JUDICIAL HOUSE OF LORDS, 1876–2009, at 
64 (Louis Blom-Cooper et al. eds., 2009).   
155 Department of Constitutional Affairs, “Constitutional Reform:  A Supreme 
Court for the U.K.” (2003), available at 
http://www.dca.gov.uk/consult/supremecourt/supreme.pdf 
156 Department of Constitutional Affairs, “Constitutional Reform:  A New Way 
of Appointing Judges,” (2003),  available at 
http://www.dca.gov.uk/consult/jacomission/judges.pdf 
157 For House of Commons committee hearing, see supra note 143; for House of 
Lords committee hearing, see supra note 149. 
 158. CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, REPORT ON JUDICIAL 
APPOINTMENTS AND A SUPREME COURT (COURT OF FINAL APPEAL), 2003-4. 
H.C. 48-I, at 27–28 (U.K.) [hereinafter JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS REPORT I]. 
 159. ROBERT HAZELL, UNIV. COLL. LONDON, WRITTEN EVIDENCE 
SUBMITTED TO THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS OF THE 
HOUSE OF COMMONS (2003) (U.K.), available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmselect/cmconst/48/48we
12.htm. 
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compromise, Hazell favored post-appointment parliamentary 
hearings for high level judges as a means for the legislature and 
public to get to know the new judges, i.e., as a type of “meet and 
greet.”160 
The Commons committee did not cite its reasons for rejecting 
the possibility of a parliamentary role in judicial appointments.161 
Rather, the committee echoed Hazell in suggesting as a preferable 
alternative having currently serving justices testify before 
Parliament on the activities of the Supreme Court.163 
Shortly thereafter, the House of Lords Select Committee on the 
Constitutional Reform Bill heard testimony on the possibility of a 
parliamentary role in appointing judges.165  Malleson testified, 
inter alia, that the sensationalism of the U.S. Supreme Court 
confirmation process had contributed to a failure to appreciate the 
importance of an appointment role for Parliament. Hazell reiterated 
his proposal for post-appointment hearings with new Supreme 
Court justices.167 As with the Commons committee, the Lords 
committee did not detail its reasoning in rejecting a judicial 
appointment role for Parliament.168 
E. Highlights of the CRA Reform and the Principal Motives for It 
                                                                                                             
160 See supra note 144. 
 161. The Committee’s report simply stated, “[W]e heard no convincing 
evidence to indicate that confirmation hearings would improve the process of 
appointing senior judges.” JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS REPORT I, supra note 128, 
at 27 para. 87. 
 163. This view was expressed by several members of the House of Commons 
Constitutional Affairs Committee. Hearing on CRA Reform Before the House of 
Commons Constitutional Affairs Committee 11 (2003) (U.K.) (statement of 
Keith Vaz, MP). 
 165. SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM BILL, FIRST 
REPORT, 2004, H.L. 125-I, at 99–100 (U.K.) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL 
REFORM REPORT I]. 
 167. SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM BILL, FIRST 
REPORT, 2003–4, H.L. 125-II (U.K.) (testimony of Hazell on April 6, 2004). 
168 See House of Lords report, supra note 149. 
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The CRA 2005, as enacted, abolished the Appellate Committee 
of the House of Lords, establishing in its place a free-standing 
Supreme Court, which began operating in October 2009.169 Eleven 
of twelve Appellate Committee members became justices of the 
new Court and a twelfth was named several months later.170 The 
CRA substantially constrained the Lord Chancellor’s role in 
judicial appointments, replacing his nearly exclusive authority to 
name judges with very limited review of two new judicial 
appointment commissions charged with screening and 
recommending judicial candidates at the Supreme Court and lower 
court levels.  
More specifically, the CRA provided for the Supreme Court 
appointment commission to be called into being for each vacancy, 
chaired by the Court’s President, vice-chaired by its Deputy 
President, and include one member from each of the judicial 
appointment commissions (JAC) for England and Wales, Northern 
Ireland, and Scotland.171 The CRA directs the Supreme Court 
appointment commission to recommend one candidate for each 
vacancy.172 The Lord Chancellor is empowered to accept, reject, or 
seek reconsideration of the Commission’s candidate, up to three 
times for each vacancy.173 Following this review, the Lord 
Chancellor  forwards the selection to the Prime Minister, who 
forwards it to the Queen for royal assent.174 Parliament has no role 
in the Supreme Court appointment process. 
                                                                                                             
169 “The Supreme Court; History,” available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/about/history.html 
 170. See, e.g., Frances Gibb, Sir John Dyson: A Good Choice for the 
Supreme Court, at Long Last, TIMES ONLINE (Mar. 25, 2010), 
http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/law/article7074204.ece.  
 171. The CRA specified the composition of the JAC for England and Wales 
(with 15 members, including 5 judges, 5 legal professionals, and 5 lay 
members), Constitutional Reform Act, 2005, c. 4, sch. 12 (U.K.), while the 
Judiciary and Courts (Scotland) Act, 2008, c. 3, sch. 1, provided for 10 
members, including five judges and/or lawyers and five lay members of the JAC 
in Scotland (referred to as “Judicial Appointments Board” in the Scottish Act), 
and the Justice (Northern Ireland) Act, 2002, c. 26, § 3, and Justice (Northern 
Ireland) Act, 2004, c. 4, sch. 1, provided for the composition of the JAC in 
Northern Ireland (13 members likewise to be drawn from the judiciary, legal 
profession, and lay public). 
  As noted in Part B, above, judges had historically been substantially 
involved in judicial appointments behind-the-scenes, providing informal 
evaluations of prospective judicial candidates to the Lord Chancellor through so-
called “secret soundings.” 
172 CRA 2005. 
 173. Constitutional Reform Act, 2005, c. 4, § 29 (U.K.). 
 174. Constitutional Reform Act 2005, Part 3 “Supreme Court.” More 
recently, the Constitutional Renewal Bill, 2008–9, H.L. Bill [34] (Eng.), sought 
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The CRA also created a second judicial appointment 
commission (the “Judicial Appointment Commission for England 
and Wales”) to screen and recommend a large volume of lower 
court judges each year.175 This JAC is much larger in size than the 
Supreme Court commission and is permanent, rather than 
temporary, in nature.176 As with Supreme Court appointments, the 
Lord Chancellor must accept, reject, or seek reconsideration of 
each candidate recommended by the JAC for England and Wales 
and cannot name candidates independent of the commission 
process.177 As with Supreme Court appointments, there is no role 
for Parliament in lower court appointments. 
A number of considerations informed the CRA’s creation of a 
new Supreme Court and introduction of two new judicial 
appointment processes: (1) modernizing the constitution and 
governance system through embrace of separation of powers 
principles in response to European Convention on Human Rights 
requirements;178 (2) promoting judicial independence; (3) checking 
executive power; (4) increasing transparency, legitimacy, and 
accountability of the judicial appointment processes; and (5) 
increasing bench diversity.  
1. Modernizing the Governmental Structure 
Much of the change reflected in the CRA was motivated by a 
desire to modernize the U.K.’s constitution and governance 
system.179 Most urgently, removal of the highest court from the 
                                                                                                             
 
to eliminate the Prime Minister’s role, instead providing for direct 
recommendation by the Lord Chancellor to the Queen. 
175 Constitutional Reform Act 2005, sched. 12, “The Judicial Appointments 
Commissions,” Part 1, “The Commissioners.”  
 176. Constitutional Reform Act, 2005 (U.K.); see also Kate Malleson, The 
New Judicial Appointments Commission in England and Wales, in APPOINTING 
JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER, supra note 124, at 39, 48. 
 177.  Constitutional Reform Act, 2005, c. 4, § 29 (U.K.). 
 178. A brief word on terminology: the Author uses the phrase “separation of 
powers” to capture one of the Government’s motives in enacting the CRA 
because that is the term used by the Government itself. Dep’t of Constitutional 
Affairs, “Constitutional Reform: A Supreme Court for the U.K.” (2003). The 
Author is nevertheless mindful that Britain’s parliamentary system has been 
characterized more by a balance than a separation of powers. 
 179. Peter Russell, Conclusion, in APPOINTING JUDGES IN AN AGE OF 
JUDICIAL POWER, supra note 141, at 420, 421–22 (“Judicial reform in the U.K. 
is part of a larger process of modernization.”); see also MALLESON, supra note 
116, at 40 (“The government’s underlying purpose for these changes generally 
and the creation of the judicial appointments commission specifically is to 
modernize the constitution and the legal system.”). 
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legislature was thought necessary to reflect greater adherence to 
separation of powers principles and was driven in large part by 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) Article 6, 
requiring independent tribunals for the hearing of individual 
human rights claims.180 Replacing nearly exclusive authority of the 
Lord Chancellor to name judges with reliance on appointment 
commissions also reflected a growing self-consciousness about the 
Lord Chancellor’s anomalous position as a member of all three 
branches of government, in turn reflecting heightened attention to 
separation of powers principles. 
Prompting greater awareness of separation of powers principles 
was the growing power and status of the U.K. judiciary relative to 
Parliament, enabled in part by enactment of the Human Rights Act 
1998 (HRA), incorporating the ECHR into U.K. domestic law.181 
Pursuant to the HRA, U.K. courts, including the U.K.’s highest 
court, were required to declare whether domestic law was 
compatible with ECHR standards.182 As a result, courts gained 
significant power of judicial review.183 
Also significant to this growth in judicial power was the “direct 
effect” given European Court of Justice (ECJ) rulings over 
individual countries’ law, including conflicting national 
constitutional law. Because ECJ rulings are supreme, national 
courts, including the U.K.’s highest court, have been empowered 
                                                                                                             
 180. See, e.g., COUNCIL OF EUROPE PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY, OFFICE OF 
THE LORD CHANCELLOR IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM OF THE UNITED 
KINGDOM, DOC. NO. 9798, 2003 Sess., available at 
http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc03/ 
EDOC9798.htm (recommending that the U.K. “consider the creation of a 
Supreme Court to avoid the combination of functions in the House of Lords”). 
Increased self-consciousness about the presence of the highest court in the upper 
House of Parliament was also thought prompted by the heightened attention 
given the court due to the Pinochet case in the late 1990s. See, e.g., Nuno 
Garoupa & Tom Ginsburg, Guarding the Guardians: Judicial Councils and 
Judicial Independence, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 103, 116 (2009).  
 181. See, e.g., DANNY NICOL, EC MEMBERSHIP AND THE JUDICIALIZATION OF 
BRITISH POLITICS 1–2 (2001). 
182 Human Rights Act 1998. 
 183. Parliamentary supremacy had already been undermined by U.K. 
enactment of the European Communities Act of 1972, which acknowledged 
European community law, as determined by the European Court of Justice 
(“ECJ”) in Luxembourg, as superior to U.K. domestic law. The effect of this 
subordination of U.K. domestic law to ECJ decisional law was most famously 
demonstrated in Factortame, where the Appellate Committee of the House of 
Lords enjoined enforcement of a parliamentary law held to violate European 
community law. See, e.g., JOHAN STEYN, DEMOCRACY THROUGH LAW, at xvi 
(2004); Paul Craig, Britain in the European Union, in THE CHANGING 
CONSTITUTION 84 (Jeffrey Jowell & Dawn Oliver eds., 2007). 
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to strike down inconsistent domestic law, including constitutional 
law.184 This growth in judicial power was an overarching factor 
driving both the creation of the new Supreme Court and the 
overhaul of the judicial appointment system. 
2. Promoting Judicial Independence 
Another motivation for the CRA reform was interest in 
fostering greater judicial independence. The location of the U.K.’s 
highest court in the upper house of Parliament had become 
increasingly untenable. While almost all Law Lords foreswore 
involvement in the legislative process because of the apparent 
conflict in roles (where Law Lords were empowered to debate bills 
as legislators and pass judgment on the resulting legislation as 
judges),186 a perception of (or, more accurately, anxiety about a 
perception of) a lack of judicial independence nevertheless 
persisted.187 This was redressed by moving the highest court out of 
Parliament.188 
3. Checking Executive Power 
CRA reform of the judicial appointment process was also 
thought necessary to counterbalance the growing power of the 
Prime Minister’s office, which, under Thatcher and Blair, had 
assumed presidential-like authority.189 By establishing a free-
standing Supreme Court with newly expanded powers of judicial 
review and creating a Supreme Court appointment commission led 
by the Court’s most senior members, the CRA substantially 
substituted the judiciary for the executive in judicial appointments, 
bolstering the power of the judiciary to check the executive.190 As 
former (Law) Lord Johan Steyn observed more generally of the 
CRA (and HRA) reforms, “The claim that the courts stand between 
the executive and the citizen is no longer an empty constitutional 
                                                                                                             
 184. See, e.g., DAMIAN CHALMERS & ADAM TOMKINS, EUROPEAN UNION 
PUBLIC LAW: TEXT AND MATERIALS 46 (2007); NICOL, supra note 146, at 6. 
186 Stevens, English Judges.  
187 Department of Constitutional Affairs, “Constitutional Reform: A Supreme 
Court for the U.K.” 
188 CRA 2005. 
 189. STEVENS, supra note 111, at 147 (“The more presidential style of Mrs. 
Thatcher and the declining importance of Parliament and other institutions were 
factors in making judges, as protectors of the Constitution, more important.”). 
190 CRA 2005. 
34 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71 
 
 
 
idea. It has been invigorated and become a foundation of our 
modern democracy.”191 
4. Improving Transparency, Legitimacy, and Accountability of 
the Judicial Appointment System 
CRA overhaul of the judicial appointment process, at all court 
levels, was further motivated by a felt need to increase the 
transparency, legitimacy, and accountability of the candidate 
screening and selection process, where the Lord Chancellor had 
previously relied on confidential contacts with unnamed 
informants to evaluate potential appointees. Historically, the lack 
of transparency in the judicial appointment system had not 
“significantly dent[ed] public confidence in the judicial process for 
the simple reason that very few people knew or perhaps cared 
about how senior judges were appointed.”192 With the growth of 
judicial power under the HRA, the news media began paying more 
attention to the Law Lords, and a need for transparency in the 
appointment process was increasingly perceived.193 
Commentators writing before the CRA was enacted made clear 
that it was not the actual legitimacy of the judges and judiciary that 
concerned them, where British judges were thought enormously 
well qualified and intellectually distinguished.194 Rather, it was a 
question of the perceived legitimacy of the judges and judiciary 
that was thrown into doubt by reliance on confidential 
consultations and the apparent necessity of personal connections to 
obtain a judgeship.195 Malleson, among others, underscored the 
importance of reforming the judicial appointment system to 
promote the public’s trust and confidence in the legitimacy of the 
appointment process and resulting judiciary.196 The legitimacy 
problem was thought to be much more acute in the higher than 
lower courts because reforms had already been implemented at the 
lower court level pre-CRA to create a more open appointment 
                                                                                                             
 191. Steyn, supra note 147, at xix. 
192 Malleson at 296-302. 
 193. Malleson, supra note 119, at  296–302. Thus, the House of Commons 
Constitutional Affairs Committee concluded in its CRA hearing report: “[I]n 
order for the judiciary to continue to command public confidence, it is vital that 
the process by which judges are selected and appointed must also command 
confidence.” JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS REPORT I, supra note 128, at 36. 
194 Department of Constitutional Affairs, “Constitutional Reform: A New Way 
of Appointing Judges” (2003). 
195 Stevens, English Judges.  
 196. Malleson, supra note 119, at 309–13. 
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process, including introduction of a judicial appointment 
commission.197 
Improved democratic and procedural accountability were also 
important motivations for the CRA reform, though these should 
not be overstated, where the CRA does not require that the judicial 
appointment commissioners or Lord Chancellor actually be elected 
officials.198 Nevertheless, the CRA’s judicial appointment reforms 
introduced a marked degree of democratic and procedural 
accountability insofar as (1) the members of the judicial 
appointment commissions are known, not secret; (2) the lower 
court judicial appointment commissions publicly announce judicial 
vacancies and post information on their candidate selections on a 
public website; and (3) the Lord Chancellor is constrained in his 
discretion to review the recommendations of the judicial 
appointment commissions and is required to publicly state his 
reasons for rejecting any of the commissions’ recommendations.  
5. Increasing Bench Diversity 
A fifth principal motivation for the CRA reforms was interest 
in diversifying the bench by sex, race, ethnicity, class, and 
professional background.200 By contrast with the previous 
appointment system’s reliance on private consultations, the CRA 
charged both appointment commissions with making selections 
“solely on merit” and free of political patronage.201 With their 
emphasis on merit rather than on whom a candidate knew, the 
appointment commissions were thought to offer potential for 
achieving greater diversity as well as competence, where “merit” 
                                                                                                             
 197. Id. 
 198. Section 2 of the CRA is entitled, “Lord Chancellor to be qualified by 
experience,” and it defines “qualifying experience” as service as a cabinet 
officer, MP, peer, practitioner, law professor, or “any other relevant qualifying 
experience.” Constitutional Reform Act, 2005, c. 4, § 2 (U.K.). 
 200. JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS REPORT I, supra note 128, at 36–37. This 
ongoing need for diversity is amply illustrated by the current composition of the 
U.K. Supreme Court, where 11 of 12 justices are male, all are white, and 11 of 
12 are Oxbridge educated (i.e., educated either at Oxford or Cambridge, or 
both). See, e.g., the Supreme Court, “Biographies of the Justices,” available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/about/biographies.html 
 201. See Constitutional Reform Act, 2005, c. 4, § 63(2) (U.K.). 
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was no longer to be understood in narrowly constrained, tradition-
bound ways.202  
F. Possible Hypotheses for the Historic and Ongoing Absence of 
Parliament from the Judicial Appointment Process 
Why, given the history and tradition of parliamentary 
supremacy in the U.K., has there not been a role for Parliament in 
judicial appointments, historically or currently? What follows is a 
series of non-exclusive hypotheses. Because the British 
government continues to debate the possibility of a parliamentary 
role,205 none of these hypotheses should be understood as a 
permanent bar. 
1. The Nature of the Parliamentary System 
The single biggest reason why Parliament has not participated 
in the judicial appointment process is because the executive arises 
out of the legislature, with the result that the legislature is not a 
check on the executive. The Prime Minister and his or her top 
Cabinet officers, including the Lord Chancellor, have historically 
been MPs or peers (though the CRA no longer requires that of the 
Lord Chancellor206), and so the two entities are more accurately 
understood not as checks upon one another, as in the U.S. 
presidential system, but as working together with overlapping 
goals and interests.207 
2. Revulsion at the Senate Process 
Beyond the nature of the parliamentary system, the single 
biggest factor militating against parliamentary involvement in the 
judicial appointment process is revulsion at the spectacle-like 
nature of U.S. Supreme Court confirmation hearings, specifically 
                                                                                                             
 202. See, e.g., Malleson, supra note 141, at 51–53. 
205 See infra Part II.G. 
 206. Section 2 of the CRA requires that the Lord Chancellor be highly 
qualified but does not limit that to service as an MP or peer. See supra note 155. 
 207. See, e.g., Graham K. Wilson, Congress in Comparative Perspective, 89 
B.U. L. REV. 827, 830 (2009) (“The crucial difference between Congress and all 
true parliamentary systems is that legislatures in parliamentary systems also 
have the constitutional responsibility for creating and sustaining the 
government.”). 
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those of Robert Bork and Clarence Thomas.208 The Bork and 
Thomas hearings “left a shiver of horror running through the 
system that we should have anything like that. Nothing else is 
really known about the confirmation hearings, except what people 
read about the Bork hearings and the Thomas hearings.”210 In brief, 
Senate confirmation hearings are regarded as a travesty, 
embarrassing all who are involved.211 One witness at a CRA 
hearing in the Commons predicted that the undignified nature of 
parliamentary scrutiny or confirmation proceedings could affect 
the regard with which the MPs themselves were held.212  
Whether revulsion at the Senate confirmation process actually 
motivated rejection of the possibility of parliamentary involvement 
or is simply rhetoric explaining a long-standing opposition to 
parliamentary involvement in judicial appointments is not known. 
What is most likely is that distaste at the U.S. process confirmed 
the “rightness” of Parliament’s historic nonparticipation.213 
3. Concern for the Politicization of the Judiciary 
Another factor cited by the Government and Parliament in 
refusing to recognize a judicial appointment role for Parliament is 
belief that there cannot be a parliamentary scrutiny or confirmation 
                                                                                                             
 208. See, e.g., JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS REPORT I, supra note __ at para. 462 
(Lord Bingham of Cornhill testifying on Dec. 11, 2003 before the House of 
Commons Constitutional Affairs Committee: “I do not see a role for Parliament 
in appointing members of the supreme court. There has been a good deal of 
discussion over the years about the very familiar process of nomination which 
the United States have adopted and I myself have never heard anybody in this 
country who was other than completely hostile to it.”). 
 210. Id.; see also Malleson, supra note 119, at 309–13 (“Since the highly 
politicized U.S. Senate confirmation hearings of candidates Robert Bork and 
Clarence Thomas, the use of confirmations has become almost as distasteful in 
the UK as judicial elections.”). 
211 The public drama of the Prime Minister’s Question Hour notwithstanding, 
there is substantial consensus that judges, and prospective judges, should not be 
subjected to public questioning of this sort.  See Judicial Appointments Report 
II; Malleson, supra note 119. 
 212. JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS REPORT II, supra note 156, at 10 (testimony of 
Matthias Kelly, Chair, Law Society, on November 18, 2003). 
 213. The Author thanks Julie Suk for bringing this point to her attention at 
the ASCL Comparative Law Works-in-Progress Workshop in May 2010. As she 
suggested, one reason for the ongoing exclusion of Parliament from the judicial 
appointment system might be path dependency, i.e., Parliament has not been 
involved historically and will continue not to be involved. 
38 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71 
 
 
 
process without it being infected by politics.214 In post-CRA debate 
on the possibility of recognizing a judicial appointment role for 
Parliament,215 the Government questioned whether parliamentary 
involvement might cause “questioning during the hearing [to] stray 
away from the candidate’s experience into matters of a more 
political nature.”216 The Government also expressed concern that 
parliamentary involvement in judicial appointments could lead to 
decisions “based on factors other than the candidate’s ability to do 
the job,”217 including vote “swaps” for nonjudiciary-related 
matters. 
4. Concern for the “Partisanization” of the Judiciary 
Intimately related to concern for the undue politicization of the 
judicial appointment process is concern for excessive partisanship 
infecting the appointment process and even the judicial process 
itself (i.e., concern for the appointment process affecting judicial 
behavior).218 Concern was expressed for the possibility of 
parliamentary voting on judicial candidates along pure party lines, 
as occurs increasingly frequently in U.S. judicial appointments.219 
According to Malleson, this concern contributed significantly to 
opposition to recognizing a parliamentary appointment role.220 
Yet another concern is that the judiciary would begin to reflect 
the partisan nature of the appointments process through its 
announcement of more decisions along party lines. Where the 
British judiciary has long been prized for its cross-bench behavior, 
i.e., for its lack of partisanship, this would represent a change. 
Skepticism should, of course, accompany any claim of 
nonideological behavior by judges. That said, overtly partisan 
appointment of and voting by judges would represent a perceptual, 
if not actual, change in British judicial experience. 
                                                                                                             
 214. CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM REPORT I, supra note 134; JUDICIAL 
APPOINTMENTS REPORT I, supra note 128. 
215 See infra Part II.G. 
 216. LORD CHANCELLOR & SECRETARY OF STATE FOR JUSTICE, THE 
GOVERNANCE OF BRITAIN: JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS, 2007, Cm. 6252, at 37 
(U.K.) [hereinafter THE GOVERNANCE OF BRITAIN], available at 
http://www.justice.gov.uk/consultations/docs/cp2507.pdf (“To adopt such an 
approach in this country could lead to the strong perception that judicial 
appointments were being politicised, and such a perception could have an 
impact on confidence in the independence of the judiciary.”). 
 217. Id. at 38. 
 218. CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM REPORT I, supra note 134; JUDICIAL 
APPOINTMENTS REPORT I, supra note 128. 
 219. THE GOVERNANCE OF BRITAIN, supra note 172,  at 38. 
 220. MALLESON, supra note 116. 
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5. Concern for Undermining Judicial Independence 
Another concern arising from fear of the undue politicization 
and/or “partisanization” of the judicial appointment process is 
worry about negative impacts on judicial independence, including 
concern that judicial candidates might be pressed in hearings to 
state their positions on actual cases or controversies likely to come 
before them as judges.221 Indeed, in one of its CRA consultation 
papers, the Government underscored its intention to promote 
judicial independence by excluding Parliament from the 
appointments process: “One of the main intentions of the reform is 
to emphasise and enhance the independence of the Judiciary from 
both the executive and Parliament. Giving Parliament the right to 
decide or have a direct influence in who should be the members of 
the Court would cut right across that objective.”222  
6. As a Result of the Doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty, 
There is No Perceived Need for Parliament to Shape the 
Courts Through Participation in Judicial Appointments 
Because of the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy, there was 
no perceived need for Parliament to shape the courts through 
participation in judicial appointments. As final arbiter of the law, 
Parliament could override any decision of the Appellate 
Committee of the House of Lords. Therefore, there was no felt 
need for Parliament to be involved in judicial selection. Instead, 
Parliament could “wait and see” how the Appellate Committee and 
other courts decided cases and then “correct” or amend the relevant 
case law as necessary. As scholar Danny Nicol has noted, “Judicial 
impotence vis a vis Parliament gave MPs little incentive to take 
much interest in court decisions. For MPs, the constitution was 
what happened. The courts operated only on the fringes of the 
political arena; the role of judicial review was ‘sporadic and 
peripheral.’”223 
7. Some MPs Have Exercised Behind-the-Scenes Influence, 
Both Historically and Currently 
                                                                                                             
 221. CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM REPORT I, supra note 134; JUDICIAL 
APPOINTMENTS REPORT I, supra note 128. 
 222. DEP’T OF CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM: A NEW 
WAY OF APPOINTING JUDGES (2003). 
 223. NICOL, supra note 146, at 3–5. 
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As the brief history of British judicial appointment practices 
suggests,224 individual MPs have influenced judicial selection 
throughout history, even though Parliament had no formal role in 
the appointment process. Because of this behind-the-scenes 
influence, there may well have been less perceived need for 
Parliament to weigh in on judicial appointments as a formal matter. 
8. Lord Chancellor’s Judicial Appointments were Considered 
Top Quality. Therefore, There was No Perceived Need to 
Reform the Process. 
Yet another explanation for the historic lack of parliamentary 
involvement in judicial appointments is that the Lord Chancellor-
controlled system was thought to produce a top-flight judiciary—
the rival of the world’s judicial systems. As a result, the 
appointment process went largely unquestioned. The perceived and 
actual quality of the British judiciary served as a damper, both 
historically and recently, on any sense of need for reform of the 
judicial appointment process.227 When the Government introduced 
its judicial appointment reform proposals in 2003, it took great 
pain to underscore Britain’s high quality judiciary and make clear 
that reform was prompted by perceptual, and not actual, 
concerns.228 
9. Parliamentary Scrutiny May Lead to Safe, Unimaginative 
Judicial Candidates 
Today’s reluctance to involve Parliament in the judicial 
appointment process is informed for some by awareness that the 
need to obtain a parliamentary majority for confirmation might 
result in the selection of safe or “unimaginative” candidates. As 
Richard Drabble, Chair of the Bar Council’s Working Party on the 
Supreme Court, testified at the House of Commons Constitutional 
Affairs Committee hearing on the CRA: “If you go for 
confirmation hearings or some other check that is Parliament, I 
                                                                                                             
224 See supra Part II.B. 
 227. Indeed, it continues to serve as a damper on meaningful judicial 
diversification efforts. See, e.g., MALLESON, supra note 116. 
228 See, e.g., “Constitutional Reform: A New Way of Appointing Judges” 
(2003). 
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think the real danger is unimaginative appointments . . . .”229 
Drabble explained, “You have the minister facing a need to carry a 
parliamentary majority behind a particular appointment . . . and [] 
you get a minister who will not make the imaginative appointment 
for fear of Parliament rebuffing him.”230  
10. It May Serve Parliament’s Interests Not to be Involved 
It may, of course, serve Parliament’s interests not to be 
involved in the judicial appointment process because Parliament 
can then more freely critique judges and judicial opinions from the 
outside,232 including judicial determinations of the compatibility of 
parliamentary acts with the European Convention on Human 
Rights.233 Thus, it may be politically expedient for Parliament to 
maintain its distance from the judicial appointment process. 
11. Parliament’s Weakening Stature May Dictate its 
Noninvolvement in Judicial Appointments 
Finally and pragmatically, Parliament might not have been 
recognized with a judicial appointment role because of its 
weakening stature.234 As courts continue to gain power, e.g., to 
review legislation for compliance with EU conventions, Parliament 
is increasingly marginalized.235 Because of Parliament’s 
decreasing stature, it is unlikely to be recognized with a judicial 
appointment role. 
                                                                                                             
229 See FN 221. 
 230. See, e.g., JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS REPORT II, supra note 156, at 9 
(testimony of Mr. Drabble, Bar Council Chair, on November 18, 2003). 
 232. The Author uses the term “critique” rather than “criticize” in 
recognition that Parliament is not meant to criticize judges or judicial opinions. 
See, e.g., SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, RELATIONS BETWEEN THE 
EXECUTIVE, THE JUDICIARY AND PARLIAMENT, 2006-7, H.L. 151 (U.K.). 
 233. As mandated by the Human Rights Act 1998. Admittedly, 
hypothesizing as to what Parliament “may believe” is a fiction, where 
Parliament is an institution composed of more than 600 members. 
 234. See, e.g., ALEXANDER HORNE, HOUSE OF COMMONS, THE CHANGING 
CONSTITUTION: A CASE FOR JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION HEARINGS? (2009), 
available at http://www.spg.org.uk/spg-paper-1.pdf. 
 235. See, e.g., 687 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2006) 37 (U.K.) (debating 
relative weight of parliamentary sovereignty versus judicial rule of law 
determinations in the post-HRA era). 
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G. Post-CRA Evolution of Attitudes Toward Parliamentary 
Involvement in Judicial Appointments 
Despite these hypotheses for Parliament’s historic and 
continuing noninvolvement, there has been some shift in attitudes 
toward parliamentary involvement in judicial appointments in the 
post-CRA period. 
First, the Brown administration proposed expanding 
Parliament’s role in judicial appointments and contracting that of 
the executive, even despite Parliament’s weakening stature.236 
Shortly after entering into office in 2007, the Brown administration 
announced its intention “to surrender or limit powers which it 
considers should not, in a modern democracy, be exercised 
exclusively by the executive,” including judicial appointments, and 
noted the possibility of a parliamentary role instead.237 More 
specifically, the Brown administration explored the possibility of 
post-appointment parliamentary hearings with new judges and 
justices in its 2007 “Governance of Britain” consultation paper.238  
Much of the interest in contemplating post-appointment 
hearings for judges comes from Britain’s very positive experience 
with post-appointment parliamentary scrutiny hearings for Bank of 
England Monetary Policy Committee members, conducted by the 
Treasury Select Committee since 1997.239 These hearings have 
been thought highly successful in a likewise sensitive context.  
Second, the Brown administration and Parliament began 
experimenting with pre-appointment parliamentary scrutiny 
hearings for non-judicial public appointments. The Government 
proposed Parliamentary scrutiny of certain executive functions in 
the interest of “achiev[ing] a more appropriate balance, better 
                                                                                                             
236 See FN 206. 
 237. THE GOVERNANCE OF BRITAIN, supra note 172, at 27–28. 
 238. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, THE GOVERNANCE OF BRITAIN—JUDICIAL 
APPOINTMENTS, 2007, Cm. 7210, at 43 (U.K.) [hereinafter MINISTRY OF 
JUSTICE, JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS]. The paper also raised the possibility of 
nonbinding pre-appointment hearings on judicial nominees. Id. at 41. The 
Government subsequently reported that most respondents opposed a pre-
appointment Parliamentary role regarding judges. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, THE 
GOVERNANCE OF BRITAIN—CONSTITUTIONAL RENEWAL, 2008, Cm. 7342, at 34 
(U.K.) [hereinafter MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, CONSTITUTIONAL RENEWAL]. The 
Government ultimately rejected the possibility of pre-appointment parliamentary 
hearings, recognizing that “pre-appointment hearings could be a way of giving 
Parliament a real and meaningful say in appointments,” but concluding, “[T]he 
Government has serious reservations about adopting this approach.” MINISTRY 
OF JUSTICE, JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS, supra, at 40. 
239 See, e.g., House of Commons Treasury Committee website, available at 
http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/ 
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accountability, and greater public confidence.”240 The pre-
appointment scrutiny hearings are intended to focus on the 
candidate’s professional qualifications and personal integrity, 
leading to a committee recommendation for or against appointment 
at the conclusion of the hearing..241 The pre-appointment scrutiny 
hearings held to date242 have been thought to have gone generally 
well.243 
That pre-appointment scrutiny hearings for nonjudicial posts 
could be agreed upon by the executive and legislature suggests that 
a proposal for pre-appointment review of judicial candidates might 
receive more favorable consideration today than it did in the lead-
up to the CRA. Still, current public attitudes, at least as reflected in 
responses to the Government’s consultation papers, do not support 
such a change. 
  
III. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION OF 
THE LEGISLATURE IN U.S. AND U.K. JUDICIAL APPOINTMENT 
PROCESSES 
This Part draws on Mark Tushnet’s comparative constitutional 
law methodology in seeking to understand why the judicial 
appointment processes adopted at the time of establishment of the 
U.S. and U.K. Supreme Courts were structured so differently with 
respect to legislative involvement and what that might reveal about 
the U.S. and U.K.’s national identities and/or country self-
understandings. More specifically, the Article follows Tushnet’s 
lead in seeking to understand the functional, contextual, and 
                                                                                                             
 240. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, CONSTITUTIONAL RENEWAL, supra note 189, at 
28. 
241 See FN 208. 
 242. See, e.g., INNOVATION, UNIVERSITIES, SCIENCE AND SKILLS 
COMMITTEE, FIFTH REPORT, PRE-APPOINTMENT HEARING WITH THE CHAIR-
ELECT OF THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, DR. ALAN 
GILLESPIE CBE, 2008-9, H.C. 505 (U.K.). 
 243. See Children’s Chief No Patsy—Balls, BBC NEWS (Oct. 19, 2009), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8313572.stm; see also Peter Waller & Mark 
Chalmers, An Evaluation of Pre-Appointment Scrutiny Hearings, in HOUSE OF 
COMMONS LIASON COMMITTEE, THE WORK OF COMMITTEES IN SESSION 2008-9, 
H.C. 426, at 68 (U.K.). 
 245. See id. Tushnet also articulates a universalist element of comparative 
constitutional law analysis, mainly relevant to discussions of human rights 
norms and not to the question of legislative involvement in judicial 
appointments. Id. at 68–72. 
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expressive elements of the U.S. and U.K. choices with respect to 
legislative involvement in judicial appointments.245  
A. Functionalist Analysis 
From a functionalist perspective, it is striking the extent to 
which the ideas and concerns animating inclusion of the Senate in 
the U.S. judicial appointment process mirror those informing the 
CRA overhaul of the U.K. judicial appointment systems generally, 
including concern for: (1) promoting separation of powers; (2) 
safeguarding judicial independence; (3) checking executive power; 
(4) promoting transparency, legitimacy, and accountability in 
judicial appointments; (5) promoting diversity of judicial 
appointments; and (6) ensuring high quality judicial appointments. 
These are all functional in nature, i.e., concerns for the improved 
functioning of the judicial appointment system. 
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There was only one consideration informing inclusion of the 
Senate that was not also a motivation for the CRA judicial 
appointments overhaul.254 That was concern for promoting the 
stability of the Article III appointment system. Promoting stability 
would, naturally, be a greater concern in a fledgling democracy 
like the U.S. than in a well-established one like the U.K.  
Although reasons for the inclusion of the Senate in the U.S. 
judicial appointment system substantially overlap with those 
informing CRA overhaul of the U.K. judicial appointment system 
generally, the ideas and concerns animating inclusion vs. exclusion 
of the legislature in U.S. and U.K. judicial appointment processes 
diverge dramatically, also for functionalist reasons. Most 
importantly, the question of legislative involvement turns on 
functional, or structural, differences between presidential and 
parliamentary forms of government. In the U.S. presidential 
system, the legislature and executive are designed as checks on one 
another. By contrast, in the U.K. parliamentary system, the 
executive arises out of the legislature with the result that they do 
not serve as checks on one another. Therefore, there is little 
applicability of a dual-branch (executive-legislative) appointment 
system in the U.K. 
Another functional reason for the disparate inclusion and 
exclusion of the legislature in U.S. and U.K. judicial appointments 
relates to the former’s history of judicial supremacy and the latter’s 
history of parliamentary supremacy. As a functional matter, the 
dual-branch appointment of judges, with its mutuality of checks, 
promotes confidence in (and the legitimacy of) U.S. courts’ power 
of judicial review.257 By contrast, parliamentary supremacy means 
that MPs are not particularly interested in what the courts do or 
who the judges are. And, as noted above, it may serve individual 
MPs’ interests not to be involved in judicial appointments because 
they can more freely criticize judicial decisions. 
Yet another reason for the differential involvement of the 
legislature in U.S. and U.K. judicial appointments relates to which 
branch of government was thought best able to evaluate 
prospective judges. In the U.S., the Senate was intended as a 
senior, elite body, able to identify good judicial candidates, while 
the Parliament, particularly the House of Commons was, and is, 
                                                                                                             
254 Even federalism was a shared concern, where “federalism” concerns 
informed inclusion of JAC representatives from England and Wales, Scotland, 
and Northern Ireland in the U.K. Supreme Court appointment commission. CRA 
2005 sched. 12, “Judicial Appointment Commissions.” 
257 See, e.g., Posner and Landes, Resnik. 
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not. Rather, the House of Commons is increasingly perceived as an 
ineffective and scandal-laden body (given MP expense- and other 
recent scandals), prompting Government and judicial leaders to 
keep their distance so as to avoid an associated taint.258 
In the end, functionalist analysis sheds some light on the 
different choices made with respect to legislative involvement in 
judicial appointments, but it also suggests a need for something 
more—understanding of the different contexts in which these 
choices were made – to which the Article, and Tushnet’s model, 
now turn. 
B. Contextualist Analysis 
In looking to the legal, political, and other cultural contexts in 
which the U.S. and U.K. judicial appointment systems were 
developed, the U.S.–U.K. comparison can be understood as both a 
most-similar and most-different case study. The U.S. and U.K. are 
similar in that they have a shared history, a shared Anglo-
American legal tradition, and are both common law countries with 
strong commitments to individual liberty and the rule of law.259 
Both court systems require concrete (i.e., actual cases or 
controversies) rather than abstract (i.e., pre-enactment) questions 
for review.260 Both systems feature life-tenured judges, removable 
(short of mandatory retirement in the U.K.) only through action by 
the legislature. 
In addition to the 220 years separating the establishment of the 
U.S. and U.K. Supreme Courts and attendant judicial appointment 
systems, there are other differences of import to the question of 
legislative involvement in judicial appointments. First the U.S. has 
a written constitution, while the U.K. has a largely unwritten one 
(though composed in part of written conventions). Second is the 
contrast between the U.S. presidential and U.K. parliamentary 
systems, which cannot be over-stated, with the executive arising 
                                                                                                             
258 It is for this reason that parliamentary examination of judicial candidates, 
when contemplated, is more likely anticipated in the House of Lords 
Constitutional Committee. 
 259. But see PAUL CRAIG, PUBLIC LAW AND DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED 
KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 9 (1991) (asserting 
implausibility of comparing U.S. and U.K., given different histories, 
governmental structures, political cultures, and traditions). 
 260. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 195, at 254–55. 
 262. It is principally for this reason that Graham Wilson terms the Congress–
Parliament comparison a “most different” comparison, rather than a “most 
similar” comparison. Wilson, supra note 164, at 831–32. 
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out of the legislature in the latter.262 Third, and in a closeley related 
fashion, the U.S. governance system is predicated on checks and 
balances, while the British governance system is premised on a 
balance of powers.263 Fourth, the Senate remains a powerful 
institution, while Parliament has weakened in stature. Fifth, as 
noted above, the U.S.’ highest court has been a free-standing 
institution since its creation,264 while the U.K.’s highest court 
resided in the upper house of Parliament until 2009.  
Additionally, the U.S. has had strong-form judicial review 
since the time of the Supreme Court’s decision in Marbury v. 
Madison  (1803), while the U.K. has had relatively weak-form 
review until the Human Rights Act’s recent authorization of 
judicial review of parliamentary acts for compatibility with the 
European Convention on Human Rights. 267 The Supreme Court is 
the final arbiter of U.S. law,268 while Parliament still fulfills that 
role in Britain insofar as the HRA assigns Parliament the role of 
addressing any inconsistencies that courts flag between 
parliamentary acts and the European Convention.  Lastly, the U.S. 
does not mandate judicial retirement, while the U.K. has done so 
since 1959.269 
With these similarities and differences in mind, the Article 
offers two over-arching contextual reasons for the marked overlap 
in ideas and concerns animating inclusion of the Senate in the U.S. 
judicial appointment system and the CRA overhaul of the U.K. 
judicial appointment system generally: (1) the ideas and concerns 
motivating the U.S. and U.K. judicial appointment reforms were 
inherent to the larger process of reforming constitutional 
democracies; and (2) both the U.S. and U.K. were undergoing 
                                                                                                             
263 While Britain’s “separated” powers were historically enumerated as the 
“King, Lords, and Commons,” with the primary distinction between the Crown 
and Parliament, see, e.g., Bailyn, Ideological Origins at 201-02, the United 
States’ separated powers were, and continue to be, the executive, legislative, and 
judiciary. 
 264. The Judiciary Act of 1789 provided the infrastructure for the U.S. 
judicial system. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73. 
267 See supra notes 161 and 162. 
 268. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is 
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the 
law is.”). 
269 Judicial Pensions Act 1959 (introducing age 75 mandatory retirement). The 
mandatory retirement age was subsequently reduced to 70 by the Judicial 
Pensions and Retirement Act 1993. See Mary L. Clark, “Judicial Retirement and 
Return to Practice: A Comparison of Approaches in the U.S. and England and 
Wales,” Catholic L. Rev. (forthcoming 2011). 
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transitions from predominantly political to predominantly legal 
understandings of their constitutions at the time of establishment of 
their Supreme Courts and adoption of their respective judicial 
appointment systems.  These are addressed in turn below. 
First, the U.S. and U.K. were undergoing significant 
constitutional change at the time of their judicial appointment 
reforms––in 1787 and 2005––and many of the ideas and concerns 
motivating the judicial appointment reforms were reflective of 
those informing constitutional reform more generally. These 
included concern for: promoting separation of powers, checking 
executive power, promoting transparency, legitimacy, and 
accountability in government operations, and safeguarding judicial 
independence.271 Naturally, the change undertaken in the U.S., 
with the replacement of the Articles of Confederation by the 
Constitution, was far more comprehensive in nature than 
enactment of the CRA, which principally relates to the 
composition and structure of the higher courts. 
Second, both the U.S. and U.K. underwent transitions from 
largely political understandings of their constitutions 
(characterized by strong legislative control) to predominantly legal 
understandings (characterized by expanded judicial review) at the 
time of establishment of their respective Supreme Courts and 
attendant judicial appointment systems.272 In the U.S., the early 
American state constitutions and Articles of Confederation were 
more political than legal in orientation, characterized by substantial 
legislative and popular sovereignty. The U.S. Constitution 
reflected a shift to a more legal than political understanding, with 
its checks on legislative action and embrace of higher law 
principles. 
The CRA likewise reflected a shift from a predominantly 
political understanding of the British constitution to a more legal 
one, with a stronger judiciary and increased judicial independence. 
According to Danny Nicol, writing with particular regard to the 
significance of the HRA, the U.K.’s “accession to the [European] 
Community represented the decisive turning point” in this shift 
from political to legal understanding of the constitution. Accession 
                                                                                                             
 272. This is not to suggest that judicial review is not political. As 
convincingly argued in The Least Dangerous Branch, the exercise of judicial 
review is an exercise of political power. ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST 
DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (2d ed. 
1986); see also BARRY FRIEDMAN, WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION 
HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION (2009); Robert Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The 
Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957). 
 274. NICOL, supra note 146, at 7. 
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“constituted the strongest challenge to the political constitution 
because fundamental doctrines developed by the European Court 
of Justice (ECJ) conflicted directly with the legislative supremacy 
of Parliament.”274 At bottom, Nicol argued, “the decision to join 
the Community was a decision to switch from a politics-based 
model of governance to one firmly based on law.”275   
With these contextual significances in mind, discussion now 
turns to the expressive importance of the inclusion vs. exclusion of 
the legislature in U.S. and U.K. judicial appointments. 
C. Expressivist Analysis 
What do these different approaches to the role of the legislature 
in judicial appointments reveal about the U.S. and U.K.’s national 
identities and/or self-understandings? Among other things, the 
inclusion vs. exclusion of the legislature reflects the two 
governance systems’ different resolutions of the tension between 
obeisance to popular sovereignty and higher, or “fundamental,” 
law principles.276 This is a tension most famously articulated by 
the late Harvard Law professor Robert McCloskey.277 The U.S., 
with its eventual embrace of judicial supremacy, reflects greater 
attention to transcendent legal norms and principles, while the 
British governance system, with its historic embrace of 
parliamentary supremacy, has more traditionally reflected ideas of 
popular sovereignty.278 
The U.S. and U.K. have not been static in their resolution of 
this tension, however. Rather, the early American republic moved 
from a primary focus on popular sovereignty and the centrality of 
the legislature to a dynamic relationship between popular 
                                                                                                             
 275. Id.  
276 It also, of course, reflects the revulsion with which the U.S. judicial 
appointment process is viewed and the desire to safeguard U.K. judges and 
judicial independence from this American type of politicization and 
embarrassment. 
 277. See generally ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME 
COURT (4th ed. 2005).  I thank my colleague Fernanda Nicola for bringing this 
idea to my attention. Cf. Langbein, et al., History of the Common Law at 496-
500 (noting tension between forces of popular sovereignty and predictable, 
“learned,” judge-made law in the U.S.). 
 278. The Author acknowledges that, in applying this concept to the British 
governance system, the Author takes McCloskey out of context, where his work 
was grounded in the American experience.  The Author also acknowledges the 
potential dangers of insufficiently distinguishing parliamentary and popular 
sovereignty, where the 1688 revolution ultimately came to be known for 
introducing parliamentary sovereignty, though Opposition Whigs argued that it 
established popular sovereignty.  See supra note 114. 
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sovereignty and higher law. This movement largely occurred in the 
27-year period between the Revolution and Marbury (1776 to 
1803),279 while Britain travelled a similar path over a three-
hundred year period (from the 1701 Act establishing parliamentary 
sovereignty to the CRA 2005 building a strengthened judiciary).280  
This tension between popular sovereignty and higher law 
principles (paralleling the political vs. legal constitutionalism 
noted in Part B, above) risks overstatement, of course, where 
forces of popular sovereignty and higher law should not be 
conceived of in binary opposition, i.e., as either/or propositions.281  
                                                                                                             
279 While the origins of judicial review are actively debated in the academic 
literature, William Michael Treanor compellingly charts the development and 
use of judicial review at the state, lower federal court, and Supreme Court levels 
between 1776 and 1803.  William Michael Treanor, “Judicial Review Before 
Marbury,” 58 Stan. L. Rev. 455 (2005). 
 280. Fitzgerald, supra note 104, at 267. Fitzgerald remarked:  
Of all the various reforms put forth by this government, including the 
HRA, devolution, and reform of the House of Lords, the Constitutional 
Reform Bill represents the single most fundamental and radical change 
in the British constitutional settlement in over three hundred years. 
While not its primary object, the bill will necessarily prompt a wider 
debate on the question of whether Parliament or the judiciary should 
decide whether any given law passes constitutional muster.  
Id. Fitzgerald continued: 
[T]he result might well be a judiciary that is much more prone to 
engage in the broader style of judicial review that parliamentary 
sovereignty effectively curtailed. All that is needed is for a judge to 
decide, as U.S. Chief Justice Marshall did when presented with an 
appropriate case, that it is ultimately the rule of law that is the 
paramount principle underlying the restructured British constitutional 
settlement, something which the judiciary in Great Britain appears to be 
increasingly willing to contemplate. 
Id. at 267–68; see also ,Jeffrey Jowell & Dawn Oliver, ed., The Changing 
Constitution (6th ed. 2007) at xiii, xv (“Although the British constitution remains 
in some respects a ‘political constitution’ it is becoming increasingly formalized 
… Overall in the U.K., the move from a primarily political constitution to a law-
based one is likely to continue, with important implications in the reduced scope 
of party politics and an increased role for the courts.”); NICOL, supra note 146, 
at 1 (“Law undeniably occupies a more central role in British politics than it did 
thirty years ago. Indeed, we have witnessed nothing short of the transformation 
of the British constitution from a constitution firmly based on politics to one 
increasingly based on law.” (emphasis added)); id. (“[A]ccession to the 
Community has proven the prime catalyst in the transformation of our public 
law, not least because it presented a wholesale challenge to the legislative 
supremacy of Parliament.”). 
 281. Stephen Gardbaum, for example, in 2001 hypothesized that the U.K.’s 
Human Rights Act might represent an integration of parliamentary/popular 
supremacy, on the one hand, and judicial supremacy (or higher law tradition), on 
the other. Stephen Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of 
Constitutionalism, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 707 (2001). As a follow-up to his earlier 
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Indeed, McCloskey himself highlighted the integration of the two 
forces in the operation of the U.S. Supreme Court.282 Moreover, 
the “people” as sovereign can support recognition of higher, or 
fundamental, law, as Daniel Hulsebosch argues occurred with the 
ratification of the U.S. Constitution: “Ratification, therefore, not 
only resulted in the passage of the Constitution. It also catalyzed a 
reconception of the nature of constitutions as enforceable against 
legislatures because decreed by the citizenry in their constitutive 
role as ‘the people.’”283  Hulsebosch continues:  “Legal scholars 
have rediscovered popular sovereignty as a polestar for interpreting 
the founding era.  They recognize that … the process of writing 
[the state and federal constitutions] contributed to a new sense that 
constitutions were the source of fundamental law,” thereby 
integrating popular sovereignty and fundamental law.284 Indeed, 
Hulsebosch, like Friedman, Hamburger, and Malcolm, suggests 
that American colonists before the Revolution had already 
conceived of a higher law tradition to which legislative acts were 
answerable.285 It is with this in mind that Hulsebosch notes 
                                                                                                             
 
article, Gardbaum in 2010 found that the U.K.’s HRA implementation had 
achieved a relatively desirable balance between parliamentary and judicial 
supremacy. Stephen Gardbaum, Reassessing the New Commonwealth Model of 
Constitutionalism, 8 INT’L J. OF CONST. L. 167 (2010).  
282 See, e.g., McCloskey at 247 (observing, “Judicial review in its peculiar 
American form exists because America set up popular sovereignty and 
fundamental law as twin ideals and left the logical conflict between them 
unresolved.”). 
 283. HULSEBOSCH,  supra note 24, at 237–38; accord JED SHUGERMAN, THE 
PEOPLE’S COURTS: THE RISE OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS AND JUDICIAL POWER IN 
AMERICA (forthcoming 2011) (popular sovereignty and higher law tradition are 
not inherent opposites). 
284 Hulsebosch at 237. 
 285. Friedman, The Will of the People at __; HAMBURGER, supra note 102, at 
17 (“Judges in America did not have to create for themselves a power over 
constitutional law, for already in England judges had a duty to decide in accord 
with the law of the land, including the constitution. . . . Judges therefore 
assumed they had no choice but to decide in accord with the law of the land.”); 
Malcolm, supra note 101, at 16 (“Coke’s interpretation [in Bonham’s Case] took 
hold and established an approach that the American colonists enthusiastically 
endorsed.  Here was judicial review as it would be developed in the U.S.”), 
Malcolm at 23 (“The colonists were steeped in customary English views on the 
use of judicial review and the need to hold both executive and legislative actions 
accountable to higher law.”); see also BILDER, supra note 33 at 4, 10-11; cf. 
LaCroix, supra note 202 (describing the Privy Council’s review of colonial 
judgments).  
  Hamburger asserts that the American colonists employed a “creative” 
understanding of Bonham’s Case to argue for the voidance of parliamentary acts 
on grounds of violation of constitutional norms or principles:  “Even with the 
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colonists’ rage against British interference with colonial judges, 
juries, and judgments.286  
Hamilton built on this early American understanding of higher 
law principles when he insisted that legislators were merely agents 
of the people and that the people, having entered into the 
Constitution (as higher law), could not have their will, or 
sovereignty, undermined by the legislature.  Hamilton further 
cautioned that just as the legislature was not supreme to the people, 
neither was the judiciary.  Rather, the judiciary, like the legislature, 
was charged under the Constitution with abiding by the people’s 
will in recognizing or respecting certain transcendent values and 
legal principles. As such, forces of popular sovereignty and higher 
law were integrated to a significant degree in the early American 
republic.287 
More specifically for this Article’s purposes, the U.S. dual-
branch appointment of judges incorporated the dual forces of 
popular sovereignty and higher law insofar as there was 
                                                                                                             
 
benefit of Bonham’s Case, it required considerable dexterity to argue that judges 
could hold acts of Parliament unconstitutional … In 1761, James Otis argued in 
the Writs of Assistance Case against the statutory authority for the writs, and 
according to the rough notes taken in court by the young John Adams, Otis said 
that “[a]n Act [of Parliament] against the Constitution is void.”  Id. at 275.  
Subsequently, Hamburger observed, “[T]he confidence of American [colonists] 
that judges could hold acts of Parliament void did not last very long.  The 
turning point was the publication of Blackstone’s Commentaries.”  Id. at 278.  
As a result, colonial lawyers largely gave up on Bonham’s Case.  Id.; accord 
Treanor at 468-69. 
 286. HULSEBOSCH, supra note 24, at 238 (“The American provincials had 
also argued—and, more important, acted—as though their legal systems could 
play a large role in curtailing legislation that they viewed as inconsistent with 
their constitution. That is why they responded so strongly to the imperial agents’ 
attempts to displace colonial judges and juries.”); see also WOOD, supra note 17, 
at 456 (“The growing mistrust of the legislative assemblies and the new ideas 
rising out of the conception of the sovereignty of the people were weakening 
legislative enactment as the basis for law. . . . Thus all the acts of the legislature, 
it could now be argued, were still ‘liable to examination and scrutiny by the 
people, that is, by the Supreme Judiciary, their servants for this purpose; and 
those that militate with the fundamental laws, or impugn the principles of the 
constitution, are to be judicially set aside as void, and of no effect.’” (quoting 
PROVIDENCE GAZETTE, May 12, 1787)). 
287 See Hulsebosch at 239 (“Recent scholarship also assumes that law and 
politics were discrete categories before the 1780s and then Federalists took 
constitutions out of the political sphere and tried to insulate them within the 
legal sphere.  This rigid distinction between law and politics was, however, not 
prominent in early modern legal culture.”). 
    290 See, e.g., McCloskey at 247, observing: 
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involvement by the two overtly political branches and capture by 
neither, which in turn facilitated judicial independence. Because of 
their appointment process, according to McCloskey, U.S. judges 
were sensitive to popular sentiment, never moving too far afield 
from mainstream public views in their pursuit of higher law 
principles.290 
As with the U.S., it is important to recognize the dynamic 
relationship between popular sovereignty and higher law principles 
characterizing the British judicial system. A.V. Dicey, in his highly 
influential Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution 
(1885), declared, “English constitutionalism combined two guiding 
principles: (a) the sovereignty of parliament; (b) the rule of 
law.”291 In a related fashion, J.A.G. Griffith, writing in The Politics 
of the Judiciary, asserted that British judges abided these two 
forces insofar as they were the “keepers of constitutional 
principles” while also reflecting a particular (conservative) 
understanding of the public interest.292  Thus, the U.K. governance 
experience, like the U.S., has been, and continues to be, 
characterized by an amalgam of parliamentary and popular 
sovereignty, on the one hand, and higher law principles, on the 
other. 
To what extent are the dual forces of popular sovereignty and 
higher law reflected in the U.K. judicial appointment process 
today? Here, the answer departs from that in the U.S. in a 
potentially surprising way. The absence of parliamentary 
involvement, taken together with recent strictures on the role of the 
executive in judicial appointments (i.e., CRA limitations on the 
Lord Chancellor’s role) and introduction of the judiciary’s new 
role in vetting judicial candidates, suggests a predominance of 
higher law principles over popular sovereignty.  
Thus, while the U.S. has resolved the tension between popular 
sovereignty and higher law principles by incorporating both, i.e., 
by involving the overtly political branches in the judicial 
appointment process and embracing judicial supremacy, the U.K. 
has retained the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy, all the while 
giving ever-increasing power to judges to review Parliamentary 
acts and recommend judicial appointments. As such, the U.K. 
                                                                                                             
291 A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (1885); 
see also Jeffrey Jowell, “The Rule of Law and its Underlying Values,” in The 
Changing Constitution at 6 (noting, “[S]ome of our judges have recently 
suggested that Dicey’s hierarchy of principle, with the Rule of Law playing 
second-fiddle to the sovereignty of Parliament, might be changing, and that ‘the 
rule of law enforced by the courts is the ultimate controlling factor on which our 
constitution is based.’”) (citation omitted). 
292 Griffith at 198. 
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appears to be moving from a system of popular sovereignty to one 
of increasing judicial sovereignty, including over judicial 
appointments. 
CONCLUSION 
What then does the divergent treatment of the legislature in 
judicial appointments say about the U.S. and U.K. from a 
comparative perspective? Why is the legislature involved in U.S. 
judicial appointments, and not in the U.K. with its tradition of 
parliamentary sovereignty? Using Tushnet’s functional, contextual, 
and expressivist analyses, this Article concludes that the disparate 
involvement of the Senate and Parliament  reflects their different 
roles and statuses in their respective governance systems, with a 
more significant role played by the Senate, perhaps unsurprisingly, 
given the Founders’ intent that it be an elite body, and a less 
significant role played by the Parliament, surprising primarily 
because of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. Given recent 
growth in judicial power in the U.K., some commentators, writing 
from a functionalist perspective, have warned of a potential crisis 
in democratic legitimacy and accountability arising from the 
absence of a legislative check on judicial appointments.295  
From a contextualist perspective, the Senate’s involvement in 
judicial appointments makes sense given the centrality of the 
legislature to the American governance system and recognition of 
the political nature of judicial appointments. Parliament’s 
increased marginalization from power makes its non-participation 
in judicial appointments likewise understandable currently though 
not historically.  
As for the expressive element of comparative analysis, the 
inclusion vs. exclusion of the legislature reflects, among other 
things, the U.S. and U.K.’s different resolutions of the tension 
between popular sovereignty and higher law, with an integration of 
the two forces in the U.S. judicial appointment process and 
increased attention to higher law principles in the U.K. judicial 
appointment process.  
                                                                                                             
   295 Stevens, English Judges.  
